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A key organizational feature of large United States corporations is
the separation of ownership from control. This separation creates an
agency problem, that managers may run the firm in their own, rather
than the shareholders' interest, choosing the quiet life over the max-
imization of share value. In the 1980s, corporate takeovers provided a
measure of discipline by threatening poor performers with replacement
by bidders who would reunite ownership and control.' With the lull in
takeovers in the 1990s, commentators concerned about corporate per-
formance have turned their attention to identifying alternative mecha-
nisms for disciplining management. The principal solution has been to
call for more active monitoring of management by institutional inves-
tors.2 The focus has been on a subset of these investors, public pen-
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1. See Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation,
9 YaleJ. on Reg. 119, 122-33 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev.
520, 575-91 (1990) (arguing that institutional investors' combination of large
shareholdings and economies of scale allow them to overcome the traditional problems
of shareholder passivity and thus effect changes in corporate policy and emphasizing the
major role of public pension funds); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The
Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 811, 873-88 (1992)
(proposing modest reform to provide institutional investors with greater voice in
corporate policy as means of inducing more active monitoring); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum.
L. Rev. 1277, 1336-38 (1991) (proposing reforms that would align pension fund
managers' interests with those of their funds in order to increase the incentives for
corporate monitoring); RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863, 882-92 (1991)
(calling on institutional investors to elect cadre of professional directors with the ability
and incentives to engage in active monitoring); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of
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sion funds (the pension funds of state and local government
employees), because managers of corporate pension funds and finan-
cial institutions have other business relations with issuers that are
thought to generate conflicts of interest preventing them from oppos-
ing corporate management. 3
This Article seeks to add a dose of realism to the debate over
shareholder activism in corporate governance by underscoring what
was once widely recognized in the literature but of late has been over-
looked: public pension funds face distinctive investment conflicts that
limit the benefits of their activism. 4 Public fund managers must navi-
gate carefully around the shoals of considerable political pressure to
temper investment policies with local considerations, such as fostering
in-state employment, which are not aimed at maximizing the value of
their portfolios' assets. This tension is not an isolated phenomenon.
Much of the activity of states in what is referred to as economic devel-
opment-providing tax concessions or direct payments to in-state busi-
nesses-is in response to similar concerns. Pressure may come from
the federal government as well. During the recent presidential cam-
paign, Bill Clinton advocated using public pension funds to finance in-
frastructure projects, a proposal also endorsed by a congressional
commission. 5
The hypothesized conflict that prevents private funds from oppos-
ing incumbent management is consequently not unique to that sector:
corporate managers who threaten private fund managers or their em-
ployers with loss of business as the price of opposition can just as effec-
tively threaten public funds with economic loss through, for example,
American Corporate Finance, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 10, 53-65 (1991) (describing the
political forces which act as a check on large financial institutions' ability to act as
effective monitors).
3. See, e.g., James E. Heard & Howard D. Sherman, Conflicts of Interest in the
Proxy Voting System 40-49 (1987); Edward S. Herman, Commercial Bank Trust
Departments, in Twentieth Century Fund, Abuse on Wall Street: Conflicts of Interest in
the Securities Markets 23, 72-79 (1980) [hereinafter Abuse on Wall Street];John Pound,
Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 237,
242-43 (1988); see also Chris Welles, Nonprofit Institutions, in Abuse on Wall Street,
supra, at 498, 545 (discussing conflicts for foundations). For a general review of private
funds' conflicts that does not specifically discuss the voting context, see John Brooks,
Corporate Pension Fund Asset Management, in Abuse on Wall Street, supra, at 224.
4. See, e.g., Louis M. Kohlmeier, State and Local Pension Fund Asset Management,
in Abuse on Wall Street, supra note 3, at 267, 274-304 (discussing, inter alia, incentives
for funds to invest in low-yield government bonds and the influence of political
patronage in selecting management); Kathleen Paisley, Public Pension Funds: The
Need for Federal Regulation of Trustee Investment Decisions, 4 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev.
188, 196-206 (1985) (discussing the potential conflicts facing public fund trustees and
legislative attempts to ameliorate the problems).
5. See Joel Chernoff, Funds Fear Clinton Pressure, Pensions & Investments, Nov.
23, 1992, at 1, 35; cf. Christine Philip, Irish Funds Hit with Tax Threat, Pensions &
Investments, Mar. 8, 1993, at 2 (Irish government threatens pension funds to make
social investments or lose their special tax status).
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local plant closings. Such pressure is, however, likely to be geographi-
cally constrained compared to that created by private sector financial
relationships, because state officials are most concerned with effects on
local labor markets. Although public funds could attempt to coordi-
nate investment strategies so as to protect each other's employment
level,6 the aggressive competition among states for businesses suggests
that coordination will be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain. It is an
empirical question whether the geographically-based conflicts con-
fronting public funds impose greater constraints on their managers' de-
cision-making than conflicts involving other business relations that
confront private fund managers. 7
Public funds have, in fact, been more active than other institutional
investors in corporate governance over the past few years, offering
shareholder proposals and engaging in other highly publicized activi-
ties to influence management actions.8 In addition, they vigorously ad-
vocated recently-adopted reforms in the Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC) proxy regulations to enhance their ability to play
an active role in corporate governance. But as public funds increase
their activism and that activism affects the interests of politically organ-
ized groups, such as unions and corporate managers, political pressure
on these funds will increase significantly. 9 For instance, after it was dis-
closed that a New York state pension fund had invested in a leveraged
buyout fund that financed contested tender offers, including the RJR/
6. For example, the Illinois state treasurer not only threatened to withhold future
investments in a leveraged buyout fund if the fund did not preserve jobs in an Illinois
plant that it was selling to its employees, but also stated that he would "alert state
pension boards across the country about the situation." State Treasurer Uses Pension
Funds to Pressure Owners to Sell Printing Plant, 19 Pension Rep. No. 48 (BNA), Dec. 7,
1992, at 2161 [hereinafter State Treasurer]. The effectiveness of such notification is, of
course, an open question.
7. It should be noted, however, that the evidence that conflicts of interest affect
private fund managers' decisions is, at best, circumstantial. For example, John Pound
finds less support for challengers in proxy contests in firms with a higher percentage of
shares held by institutional investors, but he cannot distinguish a conflict-of-interest
explanation from an equally plausible monitoring explanation, that firms with high
levels of institutional ownership experience proxy contests that are less credible because
such investors effectively monitor management's performance. See Pound, supra note
3, at 243. Pound does not have data on how individual institutions voted in his sample's
proxy fights, and, accordingly, he does not have any direct evidence of a significant
difference in voting practices between private and public funds.
8. See, e.g., Steven Dickson, Pension Funds Explore Corporate Governance as New
Strategy for Bringing About Social Change, Bond Buyer, Jan. 27, 1992, Review &
Outlook Supp., at 16A; Kevin G. Salwen &Joann S. Lublin, Giant Investors Flex Their
Muscles More at U.S. Corporations, Wall St.J., Apr. 27, 1992, at Al; Some Institutional
Investors Turn to Negotiations, But High Level of Proposal Activity Predicted to
Continue, BNA's Corp. Couns. Wkly., Jan. 1, 1992, at 8.
9. This hypothesis is the clear implication of Mark Roe's contention that much of
the federal regulation of financial institutions is directed at preventing them from
effectively monitoring corporate management. See Roe, supra note 2, at 31-53.
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Nabisco buyout, the governor created a task force to investigate pen-
sion fund investment policy. The task force recommended restricting
public pension funds' involvement in hostile takeovers and instructing
them to take local concerns, such as the state economy and in-state em-
ployment, into account when acquiring or voting shares.10 If activist
public funds are required to embrace such an investment agenda, then
their investment objective will diverge from that of other equity hold-
ers, who desire to maximize share value and will therefore not benefit
from public funds' increased role in corporate governance.
This Article takes three tacks in exploring the limits of public pen-
sion funds' activism in corporate governance. After providing an over-
view of the magnitude of public pension fund investments and the
regulatory regime, Part L.A recounts anecdotes of political pressure ex-
erted on public funds' investment activities and voting practices over
the past twenty years in order to convey a sense of the environment in
which the funds operate. Part I.B examines political pressure on public
funds from a more systematic empirical perspective, by investigating
the relation between fund performance and organizational form and
corporate activism. There is an inverse relation between the return on
funds' investments and the degree of political involvement in their or-
ganizational form, and between return on investments and policies
favoring social investing. There is no evidence that more activist funds
are poorer performers or have significantly different board composition
than non-activist funds. Part .C then examines whether there are sig-
nificant differences in proxy voting practices between public and pri-
vate funds. On most issues there are scant differences in the voting
policies of the two types of funds.
The anecdotal accounts and statistical evidence suggest that there
are limits to what can be expected from shareholder activism by public
institutional investors. Increasing public funds' activism is therefore a
problematic substitute for a well-functioning market for corporate con-
trol as a means of mitigating the agency problem at the heart of corpo-
rate law. Proposals that advocate increasing corporate governance
activism to discipline managers and enhance share value without paying
careful attention to the political environment in which institutional in-
vestors operate miss the mark. At a minimum, if public pension funds
are to play their prophesied role in mitigating the agency problem,
workable mechanisms must be devised to insulate funds pursuing active
corporate governance strategies from the adverse political repercus-
sions that will surely accompany such activity.
Part II explores several institutional reforms that could alleviate
political pressure on public funds: ensuring that membership of public
10. See Governor's Task Force on Pension Fund Investment, Our Money's Worth
45-48 (1989) [hereinafter Our Money's Worth]. For a detailed discussion of this report,
see infra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
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fund boards includes individuals elected by fund beneficiaries; applying
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)" fidu-
ciary standard for private funds to public funds; increasing the propor-
tion of fund assets that are passively invested, a strategy referred to as
"indexing"; constitutionalizing public funds' independence; and shift-
ing public retirement systems from defined benefit to defined contribu-
tion plans. Some proposals, such as increasing the use of indexing or
adopting the ERISA standard, are more effective at restricting social
investing than at diminishing political pressure on voting decisions.
Others, such as shifting to defined contribution plans, resolve the prob-
lem of political pressure on public fund managers by eliminating their
role in corporate governance. The latter proposal relies on mutual
fund managers, in whose funds state employees' pensions would be in-
vested, to monitor management.
This Article concludes that there are no practical solutions to the
problem of political influence on public pension funds short of a sub-
stantial restructuring of the funds toward defined contribution plans.
Yet such restructuring reduces, rather than increases, public funds' ac-
tivism in corporate governance. Moreover, although the motivation for
shifting to defined contribution plans involves corporate governance
concerns, the shift implicates a broad range of questions involving pub-
lic policy toward pensions in general, over which policy analysts disa-
gree. Caution is therefore warranted in implementing such a proposal,
despite its decisive advantages from a corporate governance
perspective.
I. PUBLIC PENSION FUND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
A. Political Pressure on Public Pension Fund Investment and Voting Decisions
Pension funds hold a substantial and growing proportion of all
corporate equity. In 1950, they held less than one percent of equities;
by 1989, they held twenty-six percent.' 2 Public pension funds are a
sizeable subset of this sector-an estimated thirty percent in
1988-89.13 The total cash and investment holdings of public pension
funds in 1989 was, at book value, over $600 billion, of which close to
one-third was in corporate stock.14 This contrasts sharply with a total
11. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1988 & Supp. 1990)).
12. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo. Lj. 445, 447 (1991).
13. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A
Comparative Perspective, 57 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1991).
14. The Census Bureau's comprehensive time-series data on public funds' assets,
which are used in the statistical analysis following infra note 108, are reported at book
value and not market value. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Series
GF-89-2, Finances of Employee-Retirement Systems of State and Local Governments:
1988-89, at vii, 8 (1991) [hereinafter Census Report] (corporate debt valued at par and
1993]
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book value of $5.3 billion in 1950.15 These figures convey the magni-
tude of the phenomenal growth of public pension funds,16 which makes
policymakers' heightened attention toward the funds' investment activi-
ties understandable.
Public pension funds are regulated by the states, as they are ex-
empt from ERISA, the federal regime applicable to private pension
funds. Two dimensions of state regulatory schemes are of particular
interest. First, state laws prescribe the investments public pension
funds can make. A majority of states subject funds to a "prudent per-
son" fiduciary standard. Although the standard's phrasing varies, a
common formulation requires funds to be managed with "prudence,
discretion, and intelligence". "under the circumstances then prevail-
ing."' 17 In addition, many states have "legal list" statutes that enumer-
ate types of permissible investments. 18 Such lists typically limit the
percentage of a fund's aggregate portfolio that can be invested in equi-
ties, or in the stock of any individual firm. Although several states com-
bine both the legal list and prudent person approaches to fiduciary
duty, others have repealed legal lists altogether and replaced them with
the more flexible prudent person fiduciary standard.' 9
Second, state statutes fix the composition of public pension fund
boards. Designated board members typically fall into one of three cate-
corporate stock at book value). The Census data include 2,387 public employee
retirement systems (of which 204 are state-administered) covering almost 13 million
employees. See id. at xi. Using 1986 data, Buxbaum calculates that public funds hold
over 7.5% of the market value of publicly-traded common stocks. See Buxbaum, supra
note 13, at 18. Heard and Sherman indicate that, as of 1986, public pension funds held
5.7% of corporate stock (market value), second only to private pension funds' holdings
of 14.9%. See Heard & Sherman, supra note 3, at 11.
15. See Kohlmeier, supra note 4, at 270.
16. The growth in public funds' holdings is due, at least in part, to large increases
in state and local government employment, see id. at 271, and the removal of statutory
restrictions on funds' equity investments. The holdings of private pension funds
increased dramatically over this period as well. See id. at 270 (book value of private
pension fund assets increased from $12.1 billion in 1950 to $216.9 billion in 1975).
17. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 24-3-411 (Michie 1992) (requiring "the judgment
and care, under the circumstances then prevailing, which an institutional investor of
ordinary prudence, discretion, and intelligence exercises"). See also Congressional
Research Serv., Public Pension Plans: The Issues Raised over Control of Plan Assets,
prepared for the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter CRS,
Pensions]. For a discussion of the prudent person rule and its distinctive incorporation
in ERISA, see Norman Stein, Trust Law and Pension Plans, in Proxy Voting of Pension
Plan Equity Securities 1, 14-16, 42-46 (Dan M. McGill ed., 1989) [hereinafter Proxy
Voting].
18. See, e.g., N.Y. Retire. & Soc. Sec. Law § 13 (McKinney 1987) (permitting
investment in, inter alia, banks, commercial and residential mortgages, debt securities,
and common stock).
19. For example, in 1985 Arizona replaced its legal list with a prudence standard
subject only to certain limits on equity investments. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38-757
(1985 & Supp. 1992).
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gories: gubernatorial appointees; representatives elected by fund bene-
ficiaries; and individuals named by virtue of their office. 20 The
designation of employer executives (state officials) as fund trustees is
not unique to public pension plans-trustees of private plans are typi-
cally officers of the employer-sponsor. 21 It does, however, raise poten-
tially serious conflict of interest problems, as trustees have dual roles,
representing employers as well as employees. The political affiliation
of a significant number of fund trustees renders public pension funds
especially vulnerable to pressure by other state officials. This vulnera-
bility is exacerbated by the magnitude of fund holdings. Particularly in
times of fiscal difficulty, fund assets are an inviting target for state offi-
cials seeking new sources of financing for local projects. There are nu-
merous examples of governors pressuring public pension funds to use
their assets to assist distressed local entities, both public and private.
1. Social Investments. - The best-known examples of political pres-
sure on fund investment decisions involve the New York state and city
pension funds' assistance to four financially distressed state agencies
engaged in lending to local housing and business development
projects, and to New York City, which was on the brink of insolvency in
20. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 36-27-23 (1991); Idaho Code § 59-1326 (1976). Statutes
often designate the types of individuals who are eligible for gubernatorial appointment.
See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38-742 (1988); Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 8308 (1988).
These are usually financial experts (investment bankers, pension lawyers, insurance
specialists, or actuaries), government officials, or employees (fund beneficiaries). See,
e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 8308 (1988). Designated ex officio trustees, who also vary
across the states, include the governor, treasurer or comptroller, education director,
personnel director, finance director, and budget director. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 36-27-
23(b) (1988) (governor, state treasurer, state personnel director, director of finance);
Alaska Stat. § 37.10.210(b) (1992 Supp.) (commissioner of revenue); Mass. Gen. L. ch.
32, § 23 (1988) (state treasurer). A small number of states designate members of the
legislature as trustees. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11:511 (West Supp. 1993)
(chairman of House Retirement Committee and chairman of Senate Finance
Committee); S.C. Code Ann. § 1-11-10 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (chairman of House Ways &
Means Committee and chairman of Senate Finance Committee). In many states, state
employees and teachers' retirement funds are operated separately, and the composition
of the two funds' boards varies accordingly. For example, the director of education will
be designated an ex officio trustee for the teachers' fund and not for the state employees'
fund when these funds are separate entities. See, e.g., Cal. Educ. Code § 22200 (West
Supp. 1993); Cal. Gov't Code § 20100 (West Supp. 1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§§ 145.04, 3307.05 (Baldwin 1992). Similarly, when there is only a combined state
employees' retirement fund and trustees are elected by members, teachers separately
elect their own representatives. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 25-11-15(2)(g) (1991); R.I.
Gen. Laws § 36-8-4 (1990).
21. Private plans are principally employer-based, but there are also multi-employer
plans that are jointly administered by management and unions in a single industry.
Corporate management or trade association employees typically represent the industry
on the plan boards, while the union-designated trustees are the union's leaders. Despite
equal numbers, the plans are dominated by union trustees. See Richard Blodgett,
Union Pension Fund Asset Management, in Abuse on Wall Street, supra note 3, at 320,
329-34; Daniel Fischel &John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1105, 1111-12, 1135-36 (1988).
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the mid-1970s. 22 After having been threatened with an "interception"
of $825 million of the state's annual contribution, the state pension
funds agreed to purchase the agencies' bonds and thereby prevent their
insolvency. State officials conceded that the proposed interception was
"only a half-desperate plan" designed when the sole trustee of the re-
tirement funds, the state comptroller, "appeared to have ruled out his
cooperation. ' 23 To bail out New York City, both the New York state
legislature and Congress enacted legislation to authorize the purchase
of the city's bonds by its pension funds, and a federal court upheld the
purchase as consistent with the trustees' fiduciary duty.24 One city
union leader, who had balked at this use of pension fund assets,
charged that the pressure "was intense, amounting to blackmail."' 25
In the 1990s, states experiencing fiscal difficulty have taken unilat-
eral action against fund assets rather than employed the earlier New
York approach of "requesting" their use in public debt purchases.
Among the tactics employed are reducing contributions to retirement
funds, altering actuarial and income assumptions in order to decrease
contribution levels, and transferring assets from pension fund to gen-
eral state accounts. 26 These policies are particularly troubling because
22. For reports of these bailouts, see Levitt Now Considering the Use of Pension
Funds to Save Four State Agencies, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1976, at 43 [hereinafter Levitt];
Steven R. Weisman, City Avoids Default by Hours as Teachers Relent, Buy Bonds;
Financial Markets Disrupted, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1975, at 1.
23. Levitt, supra note 22, at 43.
24. See Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
mem., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979). These events are detailed in Paisley, supra note 4,
at 193-96. An earlier statute that had required, rather than permitted, the pension
funds to buy $125 million of city bonds had been struck down in state court as violating
the state constitutional provision prohibiting the impairment of retirement system
benefits. See Sgaglione v. Levitt, 337 N.E.2d 592, 594 (N.Y. 1975).
25. Louis M. Kohlmeier, Twentieth Century Fund Report, Conflicts of Interest:
State and Local Pension Fund Asset Management (1976), reprinted in House Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, Pension Task Force Report on Public Employee Retirement Systems,
95th Cong., 2d Sess., 859, 869 (Comm. Print 1978) (quoting Albert Shanker, then
president of the city's teachers union).
26. Jonathan Walters, The Pension Fund Grab of'91, Governing, Feb. 1992, at 18
(California transferred $1.6 billion from state pension funds to general funds; Illinois
transferred $21 million; Texas and Rhode Island reduced contributions; by changing
actuarial accounting, New York deferred $429 million in contributions). California also
transferred actuarial decisions from the fund board to an actuary chosen by the
governor. See Cal. Gov't Code § 20006 (West Supp. 1993). California's transfer of
funds and actuarial functions was upheld against fund member and union challenge.
See Claypool v. Wilson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, cert. denied sub nom. California Bd. of
Admin. of Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Wilson, 113 S. Ct. 812 (1992). A member
and union challenge to New York's legislative change of fund accounting prevailed in
the lower court and is on appeal. See McDermott v. Regan, 587 N.Y.S.2d 533 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1992).
The use of such alternatives in place of public debt purchases is confirmed by a
cursory examination of recent fund investments: in 1988-89, state and local
government debt was an infinitesimal proportion of state pension fund portfolios
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many state pension funds are in weak financial condition: in 1991,
twenty state funds were less than seventy-five percent funded. 27 How-
ever, the most widespread type of political pressure on public fund in-
vestment policies today involves demands to stimulate local economic
activity directly by financing development projects that over-extended
states cannot fund rather than by bailing out government entities.
Most such investments are "social investments"-investments whose
return is not commensurate with their risk.28 Such investments use
pension assets for broader social purposes at the expense of fund bene-
ficiaries or a subset of beneficiaries. 29
Three examples will serve to illustrate the pressures on funds to
engage in social investing:
(1) the Pennsylvania public school employees' and state
employees' retirement funds were pressured by state officials
into assisting the financing of a new Volkswagen plant when
the state was unable to come up with the funds it had prom-
ised Volkswagen in order to induce it to locate in
Pennsylvania.30 The plant closed a decade later, and it took
(median 0, mean .05%, maximum 1%). This is not, to be sure, surprising; state and
local debt are not prudent investments for pension funds because they do not benefit
from the debt's tax exempt status. But, despite the tax disadvantage, if states were
pressuring funds to acquire their debt in today's difficult fiscal times, as New York did in
the 1970s, fund holdings of such debt would be higher. For example, New York State
debt equaled 16% of the state pension funds' portfolios during the state's 1976 fiscal
crisis. See Kohlmeier, supra note 4, at 268.
27. See Pension Comm'n Clearinghouse, Report on State Pension Systems 4 (11 th
ed. 1992). Unlike private funds covered by ERISA, public funds are not subject to any
minimum funding requirements. However, the risk that an underfunded plan will be
unable to pay promised benefits is lower for public than private pension plans because
their sponsors are governments, whose taxation power provides an alternative revenue
source.
28. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 21, at 1143. If the return on such
investments were commensurate with their risk, there would be no question concerning
their acceptability and both public and private pension funds and other investors would
undertake them voluntarily. A possible qualification concerning the market's ability to
finance such investments adequately is Lawrence Litvak's thesis of market gaps. See
infra note 66 and accompanying text.
29. Fischel and Langbein contend that it would be better to distinguish between the
two situations. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 21, at 1143. Although the former
(no benefits to any plan members) is clearly unjustifiable, the latter (benefiting some
members over others) is a more complicated situation, even under ERISA's exclusive
benefit rule. They suggest that the proper formulation of fiduciary duty when there are
conflicts of interest among beneficiaries, such as those between active employees and
retirees, is to follow a rule of impartiality-not to allow one group to benefit at another's
expense. Because such a formulation still will not support social investing since it
involves a wealth transfer across beneficiary groups-saving the jobs of current, and
especially junior, employees at senior employees' and retirees' expense-this Article
follows common usage and does not distinguish between the two categories of social
investments.
30. See Pennsylvania Pension Funds Offer VW $135 Million Loan to Help Set Up
Plant, Wall St. J., July 9, 1976, at 5.
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four years to obtain a new occupant, Sony, which required the
state to forgive $40 million of the original $70 million loan
and to provide additional subsidized loans of $23 million as
well as job-training grants.3 l
(2) the California Public Employees Retirement System
(CalPERS) announced a plan to invest up to $375 million in
local single family home construction shortly after the gover-
nor pressured it to undertake investments to stimulate
California's economy and attempted to increase his control
over the fund.3 2 Fund officials denied that the decision was
due to political pressure.33 But the timing led the editors of
the journal Pensions & Investments to question the "investment
merits of the program as opposed to [its] political expedi-
ency."3 4 In addition, the California state treasurer, a member
of CalPERS' board, thereafter proposed that the fund's real
estate portfolio be limited to financing projects using " 're-
sponsible contractors'" that pay "'prevailing wages'" and
other benefits (i.e., projects employing only unionized
labor).35
(3) In a survey of eighteen state pension funds with social
investment policies, officials of eight funds identified political
pressure as an influencing factor in the development of social
investment policies, including pressures from the governor's
office (cited twice), the state legislature (cited once), the funds'
board of directors (cited three times), fund administrators
(cited four times), the housing industry (cited four times), and
general "political and public pressure" (cited four times). 36
Public pension funds also engage in local investment initiatives
without any visible state request for assistance, and the results have, on
occasion, been disastrous. Even when such investments have not been
a total loss, they have often significantly underperformed alternative
projects with far less risk. Accordingly, such investments do not meet
prudential fiduciary standards. Again, a few examples will suffice to
convey the essence of these transactions and the problems that can
arise:
31. See Robert Dvorchak, States Trapped in a Losing Game with Corporations
Holding All Aces, New Haven Reg., Oct. 4, 1992, at Fl.
32. See Jump-start Investing, Pensions & Investments, Feb. 3, 1992, at 10
[hereinafter Jump-start Investing); Richard W. Stevenson, Pension Funds Becoming a
Tool for Growth, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1992, at D1 [hereinafter Pension Funds].
33. See Pension Funds, supra note 32, at DI, D6.
34. Jump-start Investing, supra note 32, at 10. The fund unveiled the proposal in
response to a letter from the governor requesting that the fund invest its " 'considerable
assets'" in" 'ways that would stimulate [California's] economy.' " Id. This exchange of
correspondence occurred shortly after the fund agreed, at the governor's request, to
contribute $1.6 billion of its assets to close the state's budget deficit, and at a time when
private investors were unwilling to lend to residential construction. See id.
35. See Build to Suit the Unions?, Wall St.J., Dec. 17, 1992, at A18 (editorial).
36. See Kent F. Murrmann et al., Social Investing by State Public Employee
Pension Funds, 35 Lab. L.J. 360, 364 (1984).
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(1) the Connecticut pension fund provided the key invest-
ment for a leveraged buyout of a financially distressed local
firm, Colt Industries, in order to maintain state jobs; the
fund's $25 million investment, intended as a bridge loan,
turned into a longer-term investment (equal to 47% of the
corporation) upon a further downturn in Colt's business, and
its repayment is now in jeopardy after Colt's bankruptcy
filing.3 7
(2) the Kansas pension fund invested heavily in local busi-
nesses, including a steel mill that closed and a savings and
loan that failed, which left the fund with a loss of over $100
million.38 After an investigation of the fund's direct place-
ment investment portfolio by a committee of the state legis-
lature documented the losses, the fund board placed a
moratorium on direct placement investments and fired the
investment management firms responsible for those
investments.3 9
(3) A popular social investment is the acquisition of pri-
vately insured mortgage-backed pass-through securities, which
is intended to aid local housing markets by increasing the
supply of mortgage funds for local home ownership. Alicia
Munnell found that between 1980 and 1982, ten state funds
invested in such products and "failed to exact appropriate re-
turns .. .in the presence of obvious benchmarks, once they
focused on social considerations."' 40 Although the sacrifice of
return could have been avoided if the fund managers had been
more careful in their investing, as Munnell emphasizes, the
problem of sacrificed returns is even greater for other social
investments because valuation is far more difficult than it is for
pass-through mortgages where comparable market invest-
ments exist.41
(4) A General Accounting Office (GAO) study of fifteen
affordable housing investments undertaken by pension funds
evaluated the returns on five projects. In each case, the pro-
37. See Adam Bryant, Colt's in Bankruptcy Court Filing, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20,
1992, at D1; Pension Funds, supra note 32, at D6.
38. See Pension Funds, supra note 32, at D6 ($65 million lost on the savings and
loan alone); Kansas Public Employees Retirement System, 1991 Component Unit
Financial Report 5 [hereinafter KPERS].
39. See KPERS, supra note 38, at 5.
40. Public Employee Pension Benefit Plans: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Comm. and the Subcomm. on Labor-
Management Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
68 (1983) (statement of Alicia H. Munnell). The funds invested in mortgage-backed
securities that were much riskier and less liquid than federally insured "Ginnie Maes,"
yet obtained yields below the Ginnie Mae rate.
41. See id. at 60. Housing loan programs that are restricted to in-state investments
suffer from an additional irony: such strategies simply reallocate loan portfolios with a
loss of diversification rather than increase the housing stock, which is the goal of their
proponents. Instead of state funds holding some home mortgages across the 50 states,
each fund holds a portfolio of in-state loans.
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ject's returns were either lower than comparable benchmarks
or the GAO could not determine the project's risk level and
hence the appropriateness of market comparisons.42 Given
these circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that these were
fiscally prudent investments. Yet, in each case the GAO quix-
otically concluded that the returns were reasonable or
adequate.43
Political pressure by proponents of social investing can also take
the form of limiting what are viewed by the professional investment
community as thoroughly uncontroversial value-maximizing portfolio
investment strategies, such as diversification. A telling example oc-
curred in Minnesota. In 1988, the state enacted legislation authorizing
international investments for its pension funds.44 The State Invest-
ment Board, which manages retirement fund assets, decided in 1991 to
allocate ten percent of the portfolio to international investments. But
when the Board hired an international equity manager to implement
the strategy in 1992, organized labor protested. It opposed interna-
tional investments of any kind, contending that there was no need to
invest in international equity when there was "'no shortage of needs
for investment ... in the U.S. and in Minnesota.'"45 In response to
such objections, a task force was established to devise guidelines for the
42. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Pension Plans: Investments in Affordable
Housing with Government Assistance (1992). The first project, mortgages issued by a
nonprofit organization, paid 65 basis points more than federally secured mortgages.
The GAO concluded that this return was adequate because pension funds participated
in the project, even though it admitted that the accuracy of the estimate of the risk
difference was difficult to verify. See id. at 31. In the second project, state agency
housing bonds, the GAO noted that the bonds' yields were difficult to match because
terms and maturities differed, yet then concluded the return was adequate. The state
bonds' yields of approximately 10% were, however, barely above those of medium
grade corporate bonds in three of four issues (the difference between the state yields
and comparable corporate bond yields ranged between -26 to +21 basis points on the
four issues), and the agency bonds' rating was comparable to the medium grade bonds.
See id. at 31-32. In the third project, a purchase of a series of FNMA mortgage-backed
securities, the project bonds yielded 9.5%, 9.6%, and 10.2%, but the yield on other
FNMA securities averaged 9.9%. See id. at 33. In the fourth project, a series of state
housing loans with an increasing interest rate structure used to finance a mobile home
park, the loans yielded 87 basis points less than medium grade corporate debt (9.40%
compared to 10.27%). The GAO concluded that this investment was not out of line
with market yields, although it did not determine whether the bonds, which were not
rated, were actually less risky than the comparable corporate debt. See id. at 33-34.
The final project, a purchase of state agency housing bonds, again yielded less than
medium grade corporate debt that had the same credit rating as the housing bonds, by
69 and 123 basis points respectively for two separate issues, yet the report concluded
that these are "not obviously out of line with market yields." Id. at 34.
43. See id. at 31-34.
44. See 1988 Minn. Laws, ch. 453, § 8 (codified at Minn. Stat. Ann. § 1 IA.24, Subd.
6 (West Supp. 1993)).
45. Christine Philip, Minnesota Creates Rules, Pensions & Investments, Oct. 26,
1992, at 27.
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Board's international investments, to ensure that they would meet" 'la-
bor, human rights and environmental standards.' "46 The opposition
to foreign investments was motivated by the belief that such invest-
ments reduce local employment levels because they finance foreign
competitors with lower labor costs. Minnesota's experience-adopting
investment criteria unrelated to maximizing portfolio value but con-
nected to social investing goals-illustrates the vulnerability of public
funds to political pressure. Private funds, by contrast, have been in-
vesting internationally for decades without such interference.
A recent example from Illinois graphically illustrates the conflict of
interest between a public pension fund and other shareholders that
arises when considerations other than maximizing portfolio value enter
into a fund's investment calculus. The workers of an Illinois printing
company in financial difficulty sought to purchase the firm from its
owner, a leveraged buyout fund operated by Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts
and Co. (KKR). The Illinois state treasurer threatened to withhold fu-
ture investments by the state pension fund in KKR's leveraged buyout
fund and to "alert state pension boards across the country about the
situation" if KKR did not ensure that the plant continued to operate
without any reduction in employment.47 As a member of the State
Investment Board, which is responsible for the pension fund's invest-
ments, the treasurer obtained a unanimous Board resolution asking
KKR to "do everything in its power to secure financing for the [em-
ployee's] buyout and to make the deal happen." 48 KKR apparently did
so.49 Commentators suggested that this was the first time that an inves-
tor in a KKR leveraged buyout fund had ever raised an employment
issue, as well as the first time that KKR had ever responded to such
pressure.50 This is a fascinating episode in which a public official, by
virtue of his position as pension fund trustee, pressured a firm to secure
benefits for a small number of state residents without any apparent con-
sideration of the relation between such benefits and the return to the
selling owners of the printing plant. Yet the state pension fund, as an
investor in KKR's fund, was, of course, such an owner. Moreover,
46. Id.
47. State Treasurer, supra note 6, at 2161.
48. Id.
49. In commenting on his activity, the state treasurer stated that the resolution
"wasn't designed to be a hammer or anything like that .... But if you have a
$130 million relationship with your investment manager and there's a matter
that greatly affects other people in your state, I think it's something the pension
board can express its view on .... The [resolution] was sent to KKR and lo
and behold, a couple weeks later [the printing company] is more reasonable.
The negotiations picked up pace."
Id. He also noted that a year earlier, KKR "had assured the investment board of [its]
commitment to Illinois jobs" during a presentation to the State Investment Board
seeking to increase its investment limit in the KKR fund from $100 to $130 million. Id.
50. See id.
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Illinois' objective of maximizing in-state jobs is unlikely to coincide
with the investment objectives of other investors in KKR's leveraged
buyout fund.
Although many of the preceding examples involve decisions taken
by pension funds without legislative prodding, numerous states have
enacted statutes to encourage local investment by public pension
funds. Table 1 provides a breakdown of statutes by state. The most
prevalent legislation recommends that investments be made to enhance
the economic climate or general welfare of the state or to increase local
employment.5' Some statutes further specify the proportion of fund
assets that may be used for local investments or classes of investments
with a local preference, such as venture capital.5 2 Although several
statutes qualify their social investment provisions with the caveat that
such investments be prudent, 55 as is underscored by the GAO report's
project evaluations, the difficulty of specifying comparable investment
benchmarks provides tremendous leeway for a trustee undertaking
such investments.
Local investments may also be favored by investment policies set
by public fund boards themselves rather than by legislatures. 54 In addi-
51. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 3-13d(a) (West Supp. 1992) (factors to be
considered with respect to all securities may be social, economic, and environmental
implications of investments); Iowa Code Ann. § 97B.7.2.b (West Supp. 1992)
(investments shall be made in manner that enhances state economy and in particular
results in increased employment of state residents).
52. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 24-3-414 (Michie 1992) ("systems shall seek to
invest not less than five percent (5%) nor more than ten percent (10%) ... in Arkansas-
related investments"); Cal. Gov't Code § 20205.81 (West Supp. 1993) (not more than
1% book value in small business venture capital; majority of such funds to be invested in
firms based and operating in California); Cal. Gov't Code § 20205.7 (West Supp. 1993)
(not less than 25% of funds available in fiscal year in California residential mortgages).
Legislation fixing economically-targeted investments at 5-10% of fund investments has
recently been proposed in several states. SeeJoel Chernoff, State Pension Funds Tugged
Toward ETIs, Pensions & Investments, Feb. 22, 1993, at 4.
53. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 24-3-414 (Michie 1992) (system to "favorably
impact the economic condition of and maximize capital investment in the State of
Arkansas when appropriate investment alternatives are available"); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 145.11 (Baldwin 1992) (fund board to consider "investments that enhance the
general welfare of the state and its citizens where.., return and safety comparable to
other investments currently available").
54. See, e.g., Kansas Public Employees Retirement System, 1990 Component Unit
Financial Report 11 (describing a "policy of seeking investments which impact the
Kansas economy"); The Retirement Systems of Alabama, 1991 Annual Report 5 (noting
the systems' philosophy of "assist[ing] in enhancing the financial strength of the State of
Alabama"). Voluntary board investment policies may not always be in the beneficiaries'
interests. A good example of this possibility involves the Minnesota State Board of
Investment, which manages the state pension funds. It restricts investments in liquor
and cigarette companies as well as South African investments. See Christine Philip, A
"Raging Debate" Hits Minnesota Fund, Pensions & Investments, Mar. 8, 1993, at 4.
After a study estimated that the former restrictions had reduced fund returns by $150
million, some board members, supported by retiree groups, considered removing the
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TABLE 1. STATES WITH PUBLIC PENSION FUND SOCIAL INVESTMENT
POLICIES
A. States with instructions to foster local economic development (numerical limitations in
parentheses)
By statute:
Arkansas (5-10% range), California (25% residential realty, 1% small
business venture capital), Colorado (non-statutory fund policy, 20%),
Connecticut, Florida (2% local housing bonds), Iowa, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri (3-5% small business venture capital),
Montana (3% venture capital), New Hampshire (10% home mortgages), New
York (7.5%), Ohio, Pennsylvania (1% venture capital), Rhode Island (5%),
Vermont (1% Vermont venture capital fund), Wisconsin
By Pension Fund Board or Investment Board policy:
Alabama, Alaska, Kansas, Minnesota, Oregon, Wisconsin, Wyoming
B. States with South African investment restrictions
By statute:
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont
By Pension Fund Board policy:
Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Carolina
C. States with Northern Ireland investment restrictions:
By statute:
Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana
(joint legislative resolution), New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island
By Pension Fund Board policy:
Indiana, Oklahoma
Sources: Various state codes; public employee retirement system annual reports; Buck
Consultants' Report to the Permanent Commission on Public Employee
Pension and Retirement Systems of New York State on In-State Investments
by the Public Employee Retirement Systems of the City and State of New
York (1988); Survey of State and Local Government Employee Retirement
Systems (1991) ("Pendat" database).
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tion, some states require that public funds use in-state brokers, custodi-
ans, consultants or investment managers;55 such requirements can be
financially disadvantageous if in-state firms are too small to achieve
economies of scale in securities transactions, thereby raising a fund's
transaction costs and diminishing its overall return.
As indicated in Table 1, other social investing legislation restricts,
rather than encourages, particular fund investments. Statutes or board
policies prohibit many state funds, in varying degrees, from investing in
firms doing business with South Africa or Northern Ireland. 56 At least
one state prohibits investments in corporations doing business in Iran
as well. 57 In addition, some public funds are required to follow affirma-
tive action practices in hiring outside investment managers.58 Ohio
restrictions. See id. Despite these facts, some members opposed the change and
suggested that the state legislature enact the restrictions into state law. See id.
55. See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 104.550 (Vernon 1989); Mont. Code Ann. § 17-6-
211 (1991). Local preferences of this kind appear to be accomplished more frequently
by informal rather than by statutory means. For a detailed account of such conflicts
during the 1970s, see Kohlmeier, supra note 4, at 283-86. Whether such policies create
financial hardship is unclear. For instance, some local preference policies favor in-state
brokers only if they meet the lowest out-of-state brokers' price. See, e.g., Teachers'
Retirement System of Louisiana, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 1991, at 46.
In addition, local preference laws can sometimes be evaded by hiring in-state banks or
trust companies that have correspondent relationships with out-of-state organizations;
locally incorporated subsidiaries of foreign corporations also qualify under most
statutes. See Margaret Price, NJ. Facing Hurdles in Foreign Investing, Pensions &
Investment Age, Dec. 11, 1989, at 6.
56. Statutory restrictions on South African investments may be absolute or
addressed only to firms not complying with the Sullivan principles. These principles of
corporate conduct, formulated by the Reverend Leon Sullivan in the 1970s to guide the
employee-relations practices of multinationals operating in South Africa, include non-
segregation of races in all work, eating and common facilities, equal pay regardless of
race for equal work, and development of training programs to prepare Blacks and other
non-whites for supervisory or administrative jobs. Compare Cal. Gov't Code § 16641
(West Supp. 1993) (investments prohibited) with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 147-69.2(c) (Supp.
1992) (investments prohibited in firms that do not comply with Sullivan principles).
There is more variety across the states in legislation concerning Northern Ireland
investments. The most common form of legislation restricts investments in firms not
complying with the MacBride principles, which require non-discrimination against
Catholics, although in some states this legislation is precatory rather than prohibitory.
Compare Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 3-13h (West Supp. 1992) (mandating divestiture of
funds in firms not complying with MacBride principles) with Mont. H.RJ. Res. 18, 52d
Gen. Ass., 1991 Sess. (urging funds to consider firms' compliance with MacBride
principles before investing). Other states prohibit investment in firms making weapons
for use or deployment in Northern Ireland. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 32,
§ 23(2A)(h) (West Supp. 1992).
57. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 3-13g (West 1988).
58. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Cont. Code § 10115 (West Supp. 1993) (15% of state
contracts must be with minority-owned firms and 5%o with women-owned firms); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 145.11 (Baldwin 1992) ("equal consideration" to firms owned or
controlled by minorities and women). The California law was amended in 1989 to
adjust the good faith exemption following pressure from the National Investment
Managers Association, a coalition of twenty minority-owned investment management
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goes further and espouses affirmative action goals for fund
investments.5 9
With or without statutory encouragement, the pressure for social
investing is primarily a problem for public funds. Private funds, by con-
trast, do not engage in such activities. 60 One reason for the discrep-
ancy is statutory: most commentators maintain that the ERISA
fiduciary standard does not permit social investing.6 1 John Langbein
suggests that private employers have no incentive to undertake social
investments because the employers bear the risk of lower returns, since
they operate defined benefit plans, which guarantee employees a fixed
pension according to a formula based on years of service and final sal-
ary that the firm must pay whether or not the assets in its pension fund
generate sufficient income to cover it.62 Such employers would there-
fore not adopt a social investment strategy even if it were permitted
under ERISA. Although public pension plans are also defined benefit
plans, they operate under substantially different investment incentives.
Public pension benefits are backed by the state's taxing power rather
than by a corporate promise; bankruptcy is therefore not a serious pos-
sibility. More important, the cost of lowered investment returns pro-
vides a weaker incentive for public fund managers to avoid suboptimal
social investments than their private counterparts because the bearers
of the cost, taxpayers, are an even more diffuse group, with many more
concerns, than shareholders and are therefore even less likely to moni-
tor a pension fund's management.
ERISA does not, of course, apply to public pension funds. But this
does not necessarily mean that public pension funds are free of legal
constraints. The Restatement on Trusts suggests that the common law
fiduciary standard does not differ materially from that of ERISA: the
firms, and state pension funds lowered minimum requirements for money managers to
comply with the revised statute. See Fred Williams, Funds Ease Requirements; Minority
Firms Able to Compete for $1.4 Billion, Pensions & Investment Age, Dec. 11, 1989, at 3.
59. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 145.11 (Baldwin 1992) (mandating "equal
consideration" to "investments... involv[ing] minority owned and controlled firms and
firms owned and controlled by women").
60. See John H. Langbein, The Conundrum of Fiduciary Investing Under ERISA,
in Proxy Voting, supra note 17, at 128, 135.
61. See, e.g.,John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law
of Trusts, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 72, 104 (1980) ("neither the common law of trusts nor
ERISA, correctly and conventionally understood, permits a trustee to adopt social
investment criteria on his own initiative"). For the opposing minority view, see Ronald
B. Ravikoff & Myron P. Curzan, Social Responsibility in Investment Policy and the
Prudent Man Rule, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 518, 530-36 (1980) (arguing that ERISA "can be
construed to permit trustees to pursue non-traditional investment objectives [when] that
investment has resulted in 'other benefits' for the plan's participants and beneficiaries").
62. See Langbein, supra note 60. The employer thus bears the risk of poor
investments, for in such instances it will have to use corporate, rather than pension fund,
assets to pay plan liabilities. For a detailed discussion of these plans, see infra notes
155-168 and accompanying text.
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Restatement treats social investing as a breach of fiduciary duty, per-
mitting only a narrow exception for charitable trusts, which are allowed
to make social investments consistent with their charitable purposes.6 3
Accordingly, a court could find a social investment to be a breach of
fiduciary duty, notwithstanding statutory authorization for such invest-
ments under a legal list or other provision, by holding that the author-
izing statute did not insulate the trustees from liability under the
common law prudent investment standard. Although the diffident judi-
cial response to pension fund investments in New York City bonds dur-
ing the city's financial crisis can be distinguished from much social
investing, 64 it does suggest that courts, like legislators, are sensitive to
local political considerations and are not likely to pursue vigorously
such an approach.
Quite apart from the issue of any potential legal liability, using
public pension fund assets for social investment is not intelligent public
policy. Advocates of such a use mistakenly view public pension fund
assets as "free" money or money belonging to someone other than the
beneficiaries. 65 This perception is deeply flawed. If the fund's return
declines due to problematic, politically-driven investments, either em-
ployees' retirement benefits will be reduced or the state will have to
increase its pension fund contributions, with a resultant reduction of
other state services. Even a reduction in pension benefits will probably
not decrease total government expenditures because public employee
unions will, in all likelihood, demand other forms of compensation in
future negotiations to offset their diminished pension benefits. Putting
aside questions concerning the substantive merits of targeted state-
subsidized investments, state governments do not gain from using pen-
sion assets rather than general revenues to finance such projects, ex-
cept insofar as they camouflage the true cost of local projects from the
public or transfer wealth from future to current taxpayers.
Some advocates of social investment maintain that the returns of
such projects are commensurate with their risk, and hence that the use
of pension funds for social investment is consistent with the goal of
portfolio value-maximization. Lawrence Litvak, for example, contends
that there are capital market gaps in the financing of small local busi-
nesses and low-income housing that create investment opportunities
63. See Restatement (Third) of the Law of Trusts § 227 cmt. c (1990) ("Prudent
Investor Rule").
64. In upholding the New York City pension funds' purchase of municipal debt, the
court emphasized that the purchase was necessary for the viability of the beneficiaries'
employer, and hence for the protection of the plans' future funding. See Langbein &
Posner, supra note 61, at 100-02. This consideration is not relevant in social investing
that does not involve investments in the employer (i.e., government securities).
65. For example, the New York state task force on state pension fund investments
explicitly viewed fund assets as "our" (all state citizens') money, and not as money held
in trust for state employees. See Our Money's Worth, supra note 10, at 57.
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for pension funds that will earn a non-concessionary return. 66 Litvak's
contention is the sole justification for making such investments from a
fiduciary standpoint and the best rationale from a social welfare per-
spective. The validity of Litvak's thesis is, however, an empirical ques-
tion. If, on the contrary, local investments only temporarily delay the
demise of an uncompetitive local firm or industry, then it would be
more sensible for a state to fund employee retraining rather than to
waste pension fund assets in firm-based investments that will eventually
be written off as losses.
Although the investments Litvak contemplates do not, in principle,
impose a tax on public pension funds, it is highly questionable that
many exist in non-concessionary form. An undisputed conclusion of an
early study by the Federal Reserve is that the unavailability of capital or
credit is not a major obstacle to the development of new businesses. 67
In addition, there have been remarkable innovations and expansions in
the financing of new business ventures and housing in recent years,
such as the development of a publicly traded high yield debt market
and the securitization of mortgages. If a particular small business or
residential project is unable to attract financing from the private sector,
it is far more probable that the difficulty is due to the market's effi-
ciently pricing the risk at a cost greater than the project developers are
willing to pay, rather than the result of a capital market failure. Litvak's
argument would have more force if he provided empirical support for
his assertions.
Even accepting Litvak's questionable thesis and assuming that
there are important local projects that cannot be financed by the private
sector because they are public goods or because other market imperfec-
tions exist, there is still no basis for mandating social investments by
pension funds. It is preferable for a state to fund these projects di-
rectly, from general revenues, rather than to impose a hidden tax on
pension fund assets through regulation.68 Direct funding would dis-
tribute the financial burden more equally across state residents: all tax-
payers, not only those employed by the state, would pay for projects,
which presumably benefit all residents and not just public employees.
Direct funding would also make the cost of such projects more easily
measurable.
A possible objection to allocating the financial burden of social in-
vestments among all state residents rather than on state employees
alone turns on a particular understanding of the dynamics of the polit-
66. See Lawrence Litvak, Pension Funds & Economic Renewal (1981).
67. See Dick Netzer, An Evaluation of Interjurisdictional Competition Through
Economic Development Incentives, in Competition Among States and Local
Government 219, 236 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991).
68. For similar arguments concerning problems with the use of indirect taxes, see
Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current
Developments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C. L. Rev. 225, 287-93 (1979).
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ical process. Wage negotiations between public officials and unions
may result in public employees earning more than their marginal prod-
uct because politicians are likely to capitulate to union demands, since
the benefits of agreeing to higher wages are concentrated on a clearly
identifiable set of voters (public employees), while the costs are spread
among all taxpayers. Given such a scenario, the contention is that the
public can recoup at least part of the rents received by employees in
monopoly wages by using pension fund assets rather than general reve-
nues for social investing.
But this political economy analysis takes a superficial approach to
the problem. If public employees are sufficiently well-organized to ob-
tain monopoly wages, then they will in all likelihood be able to demand
additional compensation for any portfolio losses caused by social in-
vestments. Hence, a strategy seeking to recapture taxpayer funds from
employees by placing pension assets in social investments could well
backfire and further increase the taxpayers' burden. Moreover, if pub-
lic employees are "overpaid," it is socially more efficient to confront
the problem directly by reorganizing the public sector 69 rather than to
address the problem indirectly by lowering pension fund returns.
A backdoor approach also makes a shambles of contract law: social
investing alters the contracted-for risk of employees whose pensions
make them creditors of the state. Unless ex post risk shifting is fully
anticipated by employees, this approach transfers wealth to taxpayers
because the employees will be undercompensated-their compensation
bargain assumed too low a level of risk. The message conveyed by a
state opportunistically employing such a strategy is that government
cannot be trusted. This has adverse third-party effects, as it lowers
public confidence in the reliability of contracting with the government
and thereby further increases the cost of government to taxpayers.
2. Pressures on Public Fund Proxy Voting. - Political pressure on pub-
lic funds creates significant constraints on their pursuit of a value-
maximizing investment strategy. Although the historic focus of state
officials' concerns has been on redirecting fund dollars to socially pre-
ferred investments, their efforts can as easily be directed toward influ-
encing the way public funds vote their shares. Such a redirection
would, in fact, not be very far removed from the Illinois fund's inter-
vention in KKR's negotiations with the employees of the printing
plant.70 The Iowa pension fund, for instance, follows a policy of voting
against measures that hinder takeovers, but this practice is tempered in
local contests by an additional requirement to consider a company's
69. This could be achieved, in part, by eliminating legislation and regulations that
mandate inputs and instead providing better incentives regarding output. For a popular
exposition of this common sense idea, endorsed by politicians across the ideological
spectrum, see David Osborne & Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government 138-45 (1992).
70. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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Iowa-based employment.71
A recent episode of political pressure on pension funds for share-
holder activism is especially instructive of the probable thrust of future
legislation in this area. In 1989, a New York state task force established
to examine state pension fund investments advised the governor that
state pension funds should be used to meet state needs, such as financ-
ing infrastructure programs. 72 This recommendation drew criticism
from employee and institutional investor groups.73 At the same time,
the task force criticized the state funds for supporting takeovers that
were opposed by incumbent management. 74 Concern over institu-
tional investors' support of corporate takeovers, as well as their activist
efforts to curtail managerial entrenchment, is, in fact, a central theme of
the report.75
In addition to making proposals aimed at stemming funds' support
of hostile takeovers, 76 the task force directed its attention to more gen-
eral matters of corporate governance, although concern over takeovers
seems to predominate even here. Two key proposals are the establish-
71. See Iowa Public Employees Retirement System, Annual Report Fiscal Year
1991, at 51.
72. See Our Money's Worth, supra note 10.
73. See, e.g., Council of Institutional Investors, Our Money, Our Future: A
Response to Governor Cuomo's Task Force Report Our Money's Worth 2 (1990) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (criticizing Report as obscuring fact that "elected
officials ... want to spend or borrow public employees' pension money"); Nell Minow,
Institutional Shareholder Servs., Inc., Analysis of Cuomo Task Force Report 9 (1989)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (raising concerns over social investments "that
would otherwise not be considered prudent"); The Study Comm., Retired Public
Employees Ass'n, Our Money's Safety: A Response to the Governor's Task Force
Report on Pension Fund Investment 1 (1989) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(expressing fears over "a dilution of the original commitment" to fund beneficiaries).
74. See Our Money's Worth, supra note 10, at 30-31, 47. Task force members
included state officials, corporate managers, union officials, lawyers, and investment
bankers. See id. at 62-63. Despite the hostile attitude of the members of the governors'
task force toward takeovers, the balance of the evidence indicates that takeovers benefit
shareholders and do not significantly affect employees, with the notable exception of top
management and headquarters staff. See Romano, supra note 1, at 177. For a recent
review of the takeover literature, see generally id.
75. As noted above, see supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text, the task force
attributed its creation to "controversy caused by the participation of the New York
Common Retirement Fund in the leveraged buyout fund [that acquired] RJR Nabisco."
Our Money's Worth, supra note 10, at 45.
76. The report admonishes fund trustees to consider all of the target firm's
constituents' interests in responding to a takeover bid and reminds trustees that they are
not required to obtain the "highest possible immediate return on each investment," but
can "forego the takeover premium if they think the long-term interests of the fund will
be better served by supporting the management." Id. at 47. The report then proposes
that state pension funds be prohibited from investing in LBO funds that participate in
hostile transactions or that require investments to be committed on a blind basis,
whereby investors have no discretion over the LBO fund's investments once their
money is committed to the fund. See id. Such a restriction would ensure that the state
retirement funds could not finance a hostile bid for a New York corporation.
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ment of a "duty to participate in corporate governance," which in-
cludes a "duty to be supportive of management when it has a viable
long-term strategy for growth," and a requirement of "impact state-
ments" for funds' "ownership decisions," that is, their investing and
voting decisions. 77
The duty to be supportive of management is best understood as an
effort to make funds support management in control contests, since this
is the principal context in which shareholders can actively withdraw
their support. Aside from proposing this variant of investor activism,
the report is extremely critical of shareholder involvement in corporate
governance, especially institutional investors' efforts at opposing man-
agement's defensive tactics to thwart takeovers. 78 Consequently, the
shareholder activism that the New York state task force would enshrine
in law is far removed from the aggressive monitoring envisioned by
most advocates of active corporate governance by public pension
funds. In fact, shareholder groups criticized the task force report for its
cramped view of corporate governance, as well as its apparent endorse-
ment of social investing.79
The proposed impact statements would require public reports ana-
lyzing the effect of fund investment and voting decisions on a variety of
factors, including local employment and the state economy. By making
non-shareholder interests explicit and public, an impact statement
would presumably facilitate fund boards' consideration of such inter-
ests when voting shares. If such a proposal were adopted, the benefit
to other shareholders from public fund activism in corporate govern-
ance would be sharply attenuated, if not eliminated. If the task force
had been interested in even-handed consideration, it would have in-
cluded the future tax consequences of a fund's failure to maximize eq-
uity share prices when making investment, tendering, or voting
decisions in its description of investment impact. This proposal also
seems as much directed at restraining funds' activism in hostile take-
overs as at spurring their investment in local projects. For example, by
expressly flagging votes on shareholder proposals to rescind poison
pills as an "ownership decision" requiring an impact statement, the
task force demonstrated its anti-takeover motivation.
The New York state task force also recommended altering the or-
ganizational structure of New York's Common Retirement Fund, the
one state fund that had participated in financing LBOs and which, in
contrast with the other state retirement systems, has only one trustee,
the state comptroller, who is an elected official. The task force pro-
posed establishing a board of trustees for the fund.80 The objection to
a single fund trustee is not unreasonable. In fact, from 1982 until his
77. See id. at 41, 43.
78. See id. at 39-40, 47.
79. See, e.g., Institutional Shareholder Servs., supra note 73, at 4, 9.
80. See Our Money's Worth, supra note 10, at 52-55.
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recent resignation, the single trustee, state comptroller Edward Regan,
advocated creating a board with members appointed by the comptroller
and confirmed by the state senate.8 1 Nevertheless, it is highly probable
that the impetus for the task force's proposal was the retirement fund's
participation in the LBO fund.82 Moreover, restructuring the fund's
administration would have wrested control of the fund from the state
comptroller, a Republican who was more concerned with enhancing the
pension fund's portfolio value than with engaging in social investing,
compared to the Democratic governor who chose the task force partici-
pants. The import of the New York report is clear: fund administra-
tors' positions will be jeopardized if their corporate governance
activities are disliked by interest groups with political clout, such as cor-
porate management.
Despite the task force's consensus, it produced no legislation. As
the above analysis suggests, the state's pensioners would derive no ben-
efit from its recommendations, and not surprisingly, the state Retired
Public Employees Association opposed the report.8 3 Institutional in-
vestor groups also voiced concern over the proposals.8 4 Moreover, the
political division of the state legislature, in which each of the two polit-
ical parties control one chamber, undercut the governor's ability to re-
duce the comptroller's power. Finally, the absence of hostile takeover
attempts on New York firms subsequent to the task force's work, and
hence of visible pension fund support for such transactions, undoubt-
edly contributed to the legislature's inaction. A follow-up report, com-
missioned by the legislature to study economically targeted investment
programs and to determine how to implement the task force's recom-
mendation of increased in-state investments by the pension funds,
backed away from the task force's suggestion of mandating social in-
vestments and proposed instead only the creation of a new state agency
to identify worthy investments for the funds' consideration.8 5 A change
in the acquisitions climate or the political composition of the state legis-
lature may well, however, revive the more intrusive proposals.
California provides a second example of an attack on the indepen-
dence of a pension fund active in corporate governance, although the
activity in California was a sidebar to an effort to redirect pension fund
assets to general revenues in order to alleviate a budget deficit. In
1991, California's governor proposed replacing the current CalPERS
81. See, e.g., N.Y.S. Ass'y Bill No. 2454 (May 8, 1992).
82. See Anise C. Wallace, Talking Business with Millstein of Pension Fund Task
Force, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1989, at D2 (task force chairman criticizing pension funds
for investing in LBOs).
83. See Retired Public Employees Ass'n, supra note 73. As their study committee
noted, there were no retirees on the governor's task force. See id. at 1.
84. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
85. See Lee Smith et al., Competitive Plus: Economically Targeted Investments by
Pension Funds (1990) (prepared by the New York State Industrial Cooperation Council
and reviewed by the Governor's Task Force on Pension Fund Investment).
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board with a new board, a majority of whose members the governor
would appoint himself 8 6 The proposal accompanied a plan to transfer
$1.6 billion that was earmarked for pensioners' cost-of-living increases
from the fund to general state funds in order to help plug a $14 billion
state budget deficit.8 7 An additional proposal transferred actuarial re-
sponsibilities from the fund to the governor's office; the expectation
was that the new actuary would select a different set of actuarial as-
sumptions so as to reduce the state's required contributions. 88
CalPERS executives charged that the proposal to reorganize the
board was motivated by the governor's displeasure with the fund's
monitoring of corporate managers; the implication was that the gover-
nor (a Republican who was said to be identified with business groups)
wanted to "shut down" the fund's shareholder rights program.8 9 In
the months prior to the governor's proposal, CalPERS had criticized
management at Sears, General Motors, and ITT, among others, for re-
ceiving excessive executive compensation. In prior years, it had chal-
lenged management at major California-based corporations such as
Occidental Petroleum and Lockheed, and sought the creation of share-
holder advisory committees.90 Commentators feared that the proposed
change in the CalPERS board would put an end to the fund's corporate
governance efforts and discourage other funds from engaging in simi-
lar activism.91 The governor, however, denied that he was troubled by
the fund's activism and maintained that the purpose of the proposed
reorganization was purely to safeguard taxpayer dollars. 92 The final
proposal enacted by the legislature transferred the funds to general
86. See Denise Gellene, Q&A: A Guide to the State Retirement System, L.A.
Times, June 19, 1991, at D1, D14 (the governor appoints four of the existing thirteen-
person board, and would have appointed five of the proposed nine-person board).
87. The $1.6 billion was "excess interest," investment income earned above
CalPERS's target return of 8.5%. The fund's practice was to pay out the excess interest
to retirees as cost-of-living adjustments if inflation had reduced their purchasing power
by more than 25%. See id. at D14. The governor's plan, which recaptured the excess
interest for the state, guaranteed cost-of-living increases regardless of the existence of
excess interest in a particular year, but altered the formula so as to reduce future
increases: pension adjustments would come into effect only when purchasing power fell
by more than 32%, and Social Security benefits would be included in the calculation.
See id.
88. See id.
89. See Steve Hemmerick, California Fund Fighting Back, Pensions & Investment
Age, June 24, 1991, at 2; Tom Petruno, Reforming CalPERS; A Case of Fixing What
Ain't Broke, L.A. Times, June 21, 1991, at Dl, D3.
90. See ScotJ. Paltrow, Pension Experts Troubled by Plan to Tap CalPERS, L.A.
Times,June 19, 1991, at DI, D14; Petruno, supra note 89, at D3.
91. See Paltrow, supra note 90, at D14.
92. See Petruno, supra note 89, at D3; see also Hemmerick, supra note 89, at 39.
In elaborating the fiscal reason for the move, the governor's press secretary contended
that the current board was "making decisions that benefit the retirees without
considering the cost to taxpayers." George Skelton, Governor Pleads with Assembly
Republicans, L.A. Times, June 18, 1991, at Al, A20. For the current statutory
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revenues and the actuary's appointment to the governor, but left the
board's composition unchanged. As was true in New York, the pro-
posed board reorganization would have shifted control of the pension
fund to the governor, whose party did not control the legislature, a
factor undoubtedly contributing to the legislature's inaction.
The New York and California attempts to restrain fund officials,
not the proposals to enhance institutional investor activism advanced
by academics, are the most likely harbingers of the legislative efforts
that will be forthcoming across the states if public pension funds'
activism in corporate governance accelerates. As the New York and
California examples indicate, more active monitoring may well offend
and galvanize into action important local constituencies, such as corpo-
rate management, who have considerable influence on state officials.
Of course, unlike most shareholders, fund administrators are not with-
out their own political resources: they can mobilize support from fund
beneficiaries, who are unionized public employees, and other officials,
including those who are board members, to offset management's lobby-
ing efforts. 93 But the most probable reason for why neither the New
York nor the California board reorganization proposal was enacted in-
volves a special political dynamic: divided government. In both states,
the restructuring proposals would have shifted control over the funds
from one political party to another. The challenged party was able to
block the change because it controlled at least one organ of govern-
ment whose approval was necessary to effect the change. In states with
one-party governments, where restructuring proposals would restrain
activist funds without shifting the balance of power across political par-
ties, the outcome is likely to differ.
Legislative and executive threats to usurp fund control need not be
carried out in order for them to influence public pension fund boards'
behavior. It is quite possible that fund boards comprised of political
appointees will capitulate to local interest groups' investing and voting
demands in order to forestall frontal attacks on fund organization and
assets. This is, indeed, the most plausible reading of CalPERS' com-
mitment of $375 million to local housing development shortly after the
governor's attack on its independence. 94 While neither CalPERS nor
the New York Common Retirement Fund discontinued their corporate
governance programs in 1992, both announced that they "would aban-
don the shareholder-proposal avenue in favor of direct negotiations," a
so-called "quiet diplomacy" strategy, less confrontational with corpo-
provisions concerning CalPERS' board composition and the appointment of its actuary,
see Cal. Gov't Code §§ 20100, 20006 (West Supp. 1993).
93. For example, the Democratic party ex officio members of the CalPERS Board,
along with Democratic Congressmen, attacked the governor's board reconfiguration
plan. See Hemmerick, supra note 89, at D3.
94. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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rate management than their prior approach.95 Unless the funds return
to a more activist strategy in the future,96 the New York and California
funds' defeat of the board reorganization proposals may turn out to be
pyrrhic victories: governors may have lost the battle over fund board
organization but won the larger war over fund board activism. 97
B. Impact of Public Fund Organization on Investment Returns and
Shareholder Activism
The controversies over the organization of the California and New
York pension fund boards suggest that board composition makes a
difference for fund investment and voting policies. Given that many
public fund board members are politicians or political appointees, in-
vestment and voting decisions may well be imbued with non-portfolio
value-maximizing considerations even when there is no observable
political pressure from other state officials. In order to determine
whether this is so, one must examine whether fund performance varies
significantly with board composition. In particular, do funds with a
higher proportion of appointed and ex officio board members perform
more poorly than those with less politicized board structures?
Board members who are elected by plan participants and are them-
selves fund beneficiaries are likely to be less susceptible to political in-
fluence or pressure because their personal retirement funds are at stake
and their positions do not depend on the good graces of state offi-
cials. 98 This hypothesis draws support from research on the incentive
95. Some Institutional Investors Turn to Negotiations, But High Level of Proposal
Activity Predicted to Continue, BNA's Corp. Couns. Wkly.,Jan. 1, 1992, at 8.
96. This may be easier to undertake under the SEC's newly adopted proxy process
reforms. For example, shareholders can now communicate with each other and publicly
express how they intend to vote on particular proposals without having to comply with
the stringent requirements for proxy solicitation. See Final Rules on Regulation of
Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31326, 57 Fed.
Reg. 48,276 (1992).
97. It is instructive to note that the CalPERS Board has apparently expressed
concern that the fund's chief executive, Dale Hanson, is spending too much time on
corporate governance and not enough on managing CalPERS. See George Anders,
Restless Natives: While Head of CalPERS Lectures Other Firms, His Own Board Frets,
Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Restless Natives]. The source of concern
appears to be the low return on CalPERS's $5 billion real-estate portfolio and
international equity holdings. Although these are both sectors in which all investors are
doing poorly, CalPERS had allocated a larger proportion of its portfolio to such
investments than the average public fund. See id. at A9. But it is altogether possible
that these financial results are simply providing an opportunity for board members to
restrain Hanson's corporate governance activities in order to please constituents
dissatisfied with CalPERS's policy of shareholder activism.
98. Although ev officio board members also have a financial stake in a state pension,
their interest in reelection to public office conflicts with their interest as future
pensioners when it comes to social investing and voting policies. The former interest,
whose value is higher at reasonable discount rates, is most likely to dominate their
decision-making. One would expect that this tradeoff would change as the politician
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alignment problem caused by the separation of ownership and control
in the modem corporation. Studies have found that corporate per-
formance is positively correlated with the proportion of equity owned
by management. 99 Elected board members, as participants in a fund's
retirement plan, have a strong interest in plan performance, as do cor-
porate managers who hold stock in their firms. In addition, in some
states, pension fund earnings in excess of actuarial requirements can be
used to provide cost-of-living adjustments to retirees. 100 The incen-
tives of elected members to ensure that the board follows value-
maximizing investment strategies are even greater in such states.
Appointed and ex offico members do not have similar financial in-
centives, and, although their reputations will be harmed if a plan exper-
iences financial difficulty on their watch, the effect of social investments
on plan performance may not be observed until several years later,
when board membership has turned over. Unlike publicly traded cor-
porations, for which low stock prices signal poor management deci-
sions, there is no capital market monitoring public pension plan
boards' decisions that could inform fund beneficiaries of poor invest-
ments and thereby mitigate the intertemporal mismatching of board
members' incentives.
There is an important caveat to applying the corporate manager-
owner analogy to public pension fund board members. Public em-
ployee pensions are government liabilities set by employment contract,
and are independent of plan assets. If a plan's assets are insufficient to
meet retiree claims, the state's annual contributions will be used en-
tirely to pay current expenses rather than to increase plan assets
ages and becomes less likely to stand for reelection. Unfortunately, data such as a board
member-politician's age or reelection margin are not available to test this more
sophisticated hypothesis of board behavior.
99. See, e.g., John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity
Ownership and Corporate Value, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 595 (1990); Randall Morck et al.,
Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20J. Fin. Econ.
293 (1988). The relationship is nonlinear, with performance rising and then falling as
management's ownership increases. In addition, differences in management reaction to
takeovers depend on equity ownership-the more stock owned, the less managers resist.
See Ralph A. Walkling & Michael S. Long, Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and
Takeover Bid Resistance, 15 RANDJ. Econ. 54 (1984). The return that acquiring firms
earn from bids is also positively related to their managements' stock ownership. See
Wilbur Lewellen et al., Merger Decisions and Executive Stock Ownership in Acquiring
Firms, 7J. Acct. & Econ. 209 (1985). Similarly, productivity increases in U.K. leveraged
buy-out firms are directly related to management's ownership share. See Mike Wright et
al., Corporate Restructuring, Buy-Outs, and Managerial Equity: The European
Dimension, J. Applied Corp. Fin., Winter 1991, at 47, 56-57.
100. See, e.g., Alaska Public Employees' Retirement System, Teachers' Retirement
System Component Unit, Annual Financial Report Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1990, at
74 (employees hired before July 1, 1986 receive annual post-retirement pension
adjustments to offset effects of inflation only if the financial condition of the trust fund
permits). The California pension fund followed such a practice until the 1992
legislation discussed supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
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through investment. Accordingly, even the more political board mem-
bers have some interest in the growth of fund assets through invest-
ments because increased portfolio earnings will reduce required annual
contributions. But again, the mismatching of the timing of investment
returns and board tenure weakens these members' incentives.
The composition of public fund boards may also explain why pub-
lic funds are more active in corporate governance than private funds
even if private fund managers lack conflicts of interest involving other
business relations with issuers. Public funds are frequently managed by
individuals with aspirations to higher political office whose reputations
can be enhanced by populist crusading against corporate management.
For example, Elizabeth Holtzman, New York City comptroller and a
trustee for the city's pension funds, publicized her active approach to
corporate governance while campaigning for the Democratic party's
nomination for U.S. Senator. 1' 1 Private fund managers do not obtain
such personal professional benefits from corporate governance activ-
ism. In addition, on-the-job consumption benefits figure more impor-
tantly for financial managers in the public sector, where financial
compensation is lower than in the private sector.10 2 The prototypical
free rider problem of corporate governance activities-that only the ac-
tivist bears the costs of activism while all of the firm's investors receive
the benefits-could therefore be mitigated for public funds more read-
ily than for private funds because public funds are more likely to be
managed by political entrepreneurs, who benefit personally from such
visible activity.10 3
If this characterization of political entrepreneurship is accurate,
then we would expect a positive relation between fund activism and the
politicization of fund boards. However, it might take only one en-
trepreneurial board member to energize a fund to participate in corpo-
rate governance. It might also take only one politically-sensitive
member to prod a board to engage in social investing. If personalities
are critical to the dynamics of board decision-making, so that either a
political entrepreneur or a politically-sensitive individual influences the
other members, then the proportion of a board that has political affilia-
tions (by office or appointment) could be an imprecise measure of
101. See Elizabeth Holtzman, When Management Falls Down on the Job; Pension
Funds Can Put Independent Directors on the Board, Wash. Post, May 26, 1992, at A17.
102. A good example of such behavior is Dale Hanson, the head of CalPERS, who
"by raising the flag of shareholder activism so high.., has become a celebrity in his own
right," such that his staff calls him "'Madonna' ... [because hie creates a stir wherever
he goes." Restless Natives, supra note 97, at A9.
103. See Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and
Public Opinion, 57 U. Gin. L. Rev. 457, 469 n.32 (1988); see also Rock, supra note 12, at
479. To the extent that activism is expensive, competition could prevent private fund
managers from passing the costs on to their clients, a pressure not experienced by
public funds that further diminishes private sector incentives to engage in corporate
governance activities.
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political pressure on the board. However, a large sample, such as that
examined in this Article, of five years each of fifty boards, will sort out
whether board composition affects performance because it eliminates
noise generated by the charisma of a few individuals on some boards.
Proponents of public pension fund activism in corporate govern-
ance believe that such activities benefit investors. This position implies
that there is a positive relation between activism and fund performance.
But the relation between activism and performance is surely more com-
plex than this simple hypothesis. For example, poor financial results
could spur a fund to be active in corporate governance in order to in-
crease future returns by improving the performance of companies in
the fund's stock portfolio. Such a strategy would make fund perform-
ance appear to be inversely related to activism. Hence, if, as is likely,
there is a lag between the fruits of activism and performance, then a
negative relation between activism and performance should not auto-
matically be interpreted as evidence that institutional activism hurts
fund beneficiaries, while a finding of a positive relation between activ-
ism and performance might actually be a spurious result.104
To determine whether the hypothesized relations between board
composition, activism, and performance are accurate, these relations
were investigated for the fifty state public employee retirement plans
over a five year period, from 1985 through 1989. Table 2 provides de-
scriptive statistics concerning these plans' board composition, portfolio
composition, and performance.' 05 In most states, the vast majority of
trustees are not elected by beneficiaries. Over eighty percent of fund
board members are political, having either appointed or ex officio posi-
tions. In fact, in thirty-two states, all board members are political. In-
vestment returns are measured by earnings on investments, including
realized net gains on asset sales as well as interest and dividend income,
as a proportion of total investment holdings, valued at book value.
This is necessary because the only comprehensive database on public
fund finances reports book and not market values.' 0 6 There are several
104. As reported in Table 3, infia, there is no significant relationship between
performance and activism in this Article's data, although the sign is positive. Had the
sign been negative, this Article's analysis would not have been able to determine
whether the more complicated hypothesis of a negative relation was correct. The
activism variable is a dummy variable that does not change over time, and lagged
variables for performance and activism can therefore not be used to distinguish among
effects (i.e., regressions cannot be run that distinguish the relation between activism in
year t and performance in year t- 1 versus years t or t+ 1.)
105. Investment information was obtained from Census Reports, see supra note
14; board composition was first obtained from CRS, Pensions, supra note 17, at 26-29,
and then checked and corrected or updated for each state from the official state codes.
Where a state investment board rather than a pension fund board is responsible for
pension fund investments, the composition of the investment board is used.
106. See supra note 14, describing the Census Bureau data source. The advantage
of using census data is that it provides uniformity, and hence comparability, across states
and through time. I was able to obtain the most recent annual reports from 40 state
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well-recognized difficulties in measuring performance using book
value, not the least of which is a fund's ability to manipulate perform-
ance and report any desired return by selling appreciated shares. For
example, in a rising stock market, a poorly performing fund could ap-
proximate the return of a better performing fund that did not take as
much profit by selling stock. 10 7 But this measurement difficulty cannot
be avoided, given the absence of market value data.
This simple model of the relation between fund performance and
board composition was estimated using a random effects linear regres-
sion model. This is the appropriate technique for panel data because it
permits the estimation of both an individual state-specific effect as well
as a general ("macro") time effect, and the estimates will therefore be
more efficient than those of an ordinary least squares regression on the
pooled data. 08 The board composition regressor is the proportion of
independent (beneficiary-elected) members, which equals one minus
the proportion of political members. If the hypothesis concerning the
relation between performance and fund organization is correct, the co-
efficient of the board composition variable should be positive. Because
investment return varies with risk, any test of the relationship between
performance and board composition must control for the asset alloca-
tion of the funds' portfolios. Indeed, empirical studies in corporate fi-
retirement systems; although several states report both book and market values of
assets, the reporting is not sufficiently uniform or prevalent to be useful. I also
contacted two well known private consulting firms to locate a private database for public
fund performance, but none was available.
107. Cf. Gale Eisenstodt, "Tremendously Flawed," Forbes, Aug. 17, 1992, at 45
(discussing Japanese fund managers' ability to manipulate returns because assets are
carried at book value).
108. See Cheng Hsiao, Analysis of Panel Data 32-41 (1986). The regression
model, y, = Xd3 + ui,, is estimated in two stages. First, an ordinary least squares
regression is estimated for the model and the residuals decomposed, according to the
following structure: uit = E1 + IL, + 'q11, where E is the individual effect, p. is the time
effect, and 'q is a purely random effect. The data are then transformed by subtracting 0
times the individual means, where
6= 1--- var ('lit)
0var (,iq)+5Xvar(E)
and the model is then reestimated on the transformed data.
A fixed effects model, which permits estimation of only an individual specific effect,
was also estimated, although the board composition variable is relatively time invariant,
suggesting that such a model may not be appropriate (board composition changed over
the five years in the sample in less than ten states). In a fixed effects model, the variables
are transformed by subtracting out the individual means to permit the intercepts to vary
for each state. See id. at 29-32. When such a model was estimated, the board composi-
tion variable was negative and insignificant. However, a Hausman specification test of
the appropriateness of the panel data model indicated that a fixed effects model was not
appropriate: the coefficients on the fixed effects estimates were not significantly differ-
ent from zero. SeeJ.A. Hausman, Specification Tests in Econometrics, 46 Econometrica
1251, 1263 (1978).
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TABLE 2. PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS, 1985-1989, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Std.Dev.
IndepBd .1791 0 .8750 .2625
Exoff .2527 0 1 .2705
NongovSec .6090 .0694 .9877 .1725
Earnings .1007 .0208 .2276 .0265
Notes: IndepBd is the proportion of the board that is elected by the membership of
the pension plan, or one minus the proportion of board consisting of political
(appointed and ex offico) members; Exoff is the proportion of board that is &Y
officio (designated membership by virtue of office); NongovSec is the propor-
tion of investment holdings in nongovernmental securities, which includes
corporate bonds, stocks and other investments; Earnings is earnings on in-
vestments, including realized gains, divided by total investment holdings,
which are measured at book value.
Sources: Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Finances of Employee-
Retirement Systems of State and Local Governments (1984-85 through
1988-89); Congressional Research Serv., Public Pension Plans: The Issues
Raised over Control of Plan Assets (1990); various state codes.
nance find that asset allocation explains the bulk of a portfolio's
returns. 10 9 Given data limitations, the asset allocation variable equals
the proportion of fund holdings invested in risky assets (nongovern-
mental securities).11 ° Table 3 reports the results of the panel data re-
gression of the dependent variable, fund earnings, on the board
composition and asset allocation variables.
The results are as predicted. Earnings are indeed significantly pos-
itively related to board independence. The smaller the proportion of
board members who are appointees and ex officio members, the higher a
fund's returns. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that pub-
lic pension funds experience political demands that adversely affect
their performance. It is possible that board members who must stand
for periodic election by fund beneficiaries are more sensitive to per-
formance and thus more likely to manipulate asset sales to increase re-
turns, and that the result is therefore an artifact of the use of book
rather than market value to measure performance. But this interpreta-
tion is questionable because earnings are even more significantly posi-
tively related to the asset allocation variable, the proportionate
investment in nongovernmental securities. If the earnings variable
109. See Roger G. Ibbotson & Gary P. Brinson, Investment Markets 257-59 (1987).
110. While the proportion of a fund's assets invested in corporate equities is a
preferable variable, such data are not available prior to 1987, the year the Census
Bureau began breaking out the nongovernmental securities category into corporate
debt, equity, and other investments. I did, however, estimate regressions over the
shorter three-year period using proportion of equity as the control variable. As
reported in Table 3, the results of these regressions do not differ from those using five
years of data with proportion of nongovernmental securities as the control for risk.
Accordingly, only the results of the regressions over the longer five-year data period are
discussed in the text, because it is preferable to use the longest possible time period, so
as to reduce the noise in the performance measure.
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TABLE 3. RELATION BETWEEN PUBLIC FUND BOARD COMPOSITION AND
INVESTMENT RETURN
A. Panel data regressions, 1985-1989, dependent variable = earnings (n=250):
Variable Coeff.
IndepBd .0128 + +
(.0077)
NongovSec .0224**
(.0107)
Econdev
Activist
Coeff.
.0126*
(.0077)
.0258***
(.0108)
-. 0065*
(.0040)
SAfrica
Constant .0687 .0691R2  .0265 .0369
Adjusted R2  .0186 .0251
B. Panel data regressions, 1987-1989, dependent variable -
Variable Coeff. Coeff.
IndepBd .0166+ +  .0168+ +
(.0086) (.0086)
Stock .0445*** .0480***
(.0162) (.0165)
Econdev -.0054
(.0046)
Activist
SAfrica
Constant
R2Adjusted R 2
.0788
.0662
.0535
.0802
.0749
.0559
Coeff.
.0137+ +
(.0079)
.0213**
(.0109)
.0024
(.0048)
.0688
.0276
.0157
earnings (n=150
Coeff.
.0166 + +
(.0089)
.0445***
(.0166)
-. 0001
(.0054)
.0788
.0662
.0470
Notes: Dependent variable earnings is earnings on investments, which includes real-
ized gains, divided by total investment holdings, which are measured at book
value; IndepBd is the proportion of board elected by fund members and
hence not political (neither appointed nor ex officio); NongovSec is the propor-
tion of investment holdings in nongovernmental securities, which includes
corporate bonds, stocks and other investments; Econdev is a dummy variable
for whether fund has local investment policy or is subject to such legislation;
Activist is a dummy variable for whether fund is active in corporate govern-
ance; SAfrica is a dummy variable for whether fund is restricted from invest-
ments in companies doing business in South Africa; Stock is the proportion
of investment holdings in corporate equities (available only for three years of
data, 1987-1989); standard errors in parentheses; + = significant at .10 (one-
tailed); * = significant at .06 (one-tailed); ++ = significant at .05 (one-tailed);
** = significant at .025 (one-tailed); *** = significant at .01 (one-tailed).
The regression, yi, = Xjp + u,, is estimated as a random effects model using
RATS software, by first decomposing the residuals of the model estimated by
ordinary least squares, uj, = ei + p + iq,, where e is the individual effect, [. is
the time effect, and q is the purely random effect and then reestimating the
model with the data transformed by subtracting 0 times the individual means,
where
0 =1 - var ( 1 )Yvar (ii ,)+5Xvar ( 1
826
Coeff.
.0130++(.0077)
.0267***
(.0109)
-. 0052 +
(.0041)
.0051
(.0048)
-. 0102***
(.0039)
.0704
.0656
.0464
Coeff.
.0158+ +
(.0089)
.0510***
(.0167)
-. 0049
(.0048)
.0026
(.0056)
-. 0093**
(.0047)
.0818
.0994
.0681
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were dominated by asset sale manipulations, asset allocation would not
be a significant explanatory variable, since the ability to engage in such
sales does not depend on portfolio mix. Moreover, it should also be
noted that election by beneficiaries, and not simply identity as a fund
beneficiary, is the key to better fund performance: regressions were
run that included a board composition variable for the proportion of
appointed employee and retiree members. The coefficient was nega-
tive and insignificant.'11
The relationship between board composition and earnings sug-
gests that boards with elected members may choose riskier investment
portfolios than those with only appointed or ex officio members. But
there is little evidence of such a relationship between board composi-
tion and asset allocation because the two variables are not strongly cor-
related. 112 An alternative, more plausible, interpretation of the
regression results is that, compared to boards with beneficiary-elected
members, boards without elected members choose riskier social invest-
ments within asset classes, where the increased risk is firm-specific and
hence not priced. Such a strategy would lower returns for those funds.
This explanation suggests that the effect of politics on fund boards is
twofold: boards that are less politically independent choose a different
asset allocation as well as a different mix within asset classes. The effect
of these choices is picked up partly in the nongovernmental securities
variable and partly in the board composition variable, which is the mea-
sure, albeit imperfect, of political pressure on fund board decisions. A
final possible interpretation of the results is that less independent
boards are more apt to choose fund managers who are politically well-
connected, rather than those who perform best.
It is possible that there are diminishing returns to an independent
board: that is, performance increases as elected members are added to
a board, but declines once they constitute a critical proportion of the
board. 113 To determine whether the relation between performance
and board composition is nonlinear, the regression model was esti-
111. The estimated equation (standard errors in parentheses) is:
Earnings = .0705 + .0099 IndepBd - .0081 Appemp + .0229 NongovSec
(.0060) (.0084) (.0096) (.0107)
If the proportion of appointed employee and retiree members is added to the
proportion of beneficiary-elected members and used as the board composition variable
("allemp"), then the board coefficient is still positive, but no longer significant (standard
errors in parentheses):
Earnings = .0688 + .0029 AllEmp + .0212 NongovSec
(.0059) (.0077) (.0108)
112. The Pearson correlation coefficient for the two variables is -. 08.
113. Such a finding would be consistent with the finding that the relationship
between corporate performance and management's stock ownership is nonlinear. See
supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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mated with a squared board composition term.1 14 The coefficient on
the squared term, although negative, is insignificant.1 15 This is incon-
sistent with a nonlinear model. We thus cannot conclude that the sim-
ple linear model is misspecified and that there are diminishing returns
to the proportion of elected members on a board.
The omission of a variable for fund size could also be obscuring
the true relation between board composition and fund performance.
For instance, if there are economies of scale in portfolio management,
and if larger funds tend to have more elected board members, then the
significance of board composition in explaining performance could
simply be a proxy for an underlying scale factor. The regression was
therefore reestimated with two different size variables: total portfolio
book value and number of fund beneficiaries. Neither size variable was
significant and the coefficient on the board composition variable re-
mained positive and significant without changing substantially in
magnitude.
In order to control for the impact on performance of measures of
political interference in fund management other than board composi-
tion, additional regressions were estimated that included a series of
dummy variables indicating whether a fund is subject to social invest-
ment legislation or has adopted a policy to favor local development,
whether there are restrictions on South African investments by statute
or official fund policy, and whether a fund has engaged in corporate
governance activities. 16 As reported in Table 3, the social investment
dummy variable's coefficient is negative and at the borderline of statis-
tical significance, as it is significant at only ten percent. This suggests
114. See William D. Berry & Stanley Feldman, Multiple Regression in Practice
53-59 (Sage Publications Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences Series No. 50,
1985).
115. The estimated equation (standard errors in parentheses) is:
Earnings = .0690 + .0277 Indepbd - .0230 Indepbd2 + .0214 NongovSec
(.0057) (.0252) (.0370) (.0178)
116. The states with development policies and South African investment
restrictions are indicated in Table 1. I did not include a Northern Ireland investment
restriction variable because most states' regulations in this area are precatory rather
than mandatory. Corporate governance activities include (i) sponsoring shareholder
proposals on corporate governance, as identified in Investor Responsibility Research
Ctr. (IRRC), Shareholder Voting Almanac 3 (1991) [hereinafter IRRC Almanac]; (ii)
being identified by the IRRC as a member of the Council on Institutional Investors
(CII), see IRRC, Voting by Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance Questions
1985 Proxy Season 26 (1985); and (iii) being identified as a strong supporter of
shareholder proposals, see id. at 25. This identifies thirteen states, by respective
category: (i) sponsoring proposals: California, Connecticut, Florida, Wisconsin; (ii) CII
founders: Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, South
Dakota; (iii) otherwise strong supporter: Kentucky. I also included New York, because
the state comptroller in the mid-1980s, the sole trustee of the state retirement system,
was an advocate of corporate governance activism. See, e.g., Edward V. Regan, A New
Way to Discipline Badly Run Companies, Wall St. J., June 5, 1992, at A10.
828 [Vol. 93:795
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that, consistent with the anecdotes detailed earlier, social investing may
adversely affect fund performance. A plausible interpretation that
reconciles the weak significance of the social investment variable with
the anecdotal accounts is that less independent fund boards are as
likely to evaluate local investments favorably with a statutory command
as without one, and that board composition, rather than official invest-
ment policy, is therefore the more important factor affecting fund
performance.
The South African investment restrictions have a significantly neg-
ative effect on fund performance. This finding is consistent with the
broader literature on the financial impact of South African divestment.
Studies of the effect of divestiture on portfolio performance have found
that elimination of the stock of corporations doing business in South
Africa weights a portfolio toward small firm stocks. 117 Historically,
small firms have returned a premium over their risk-adjusted return,
and studies have found that portfolio performance in the 1970s and
early 1980s did not suffer, and indeed, improved, with a South Africa-
free investment strategy.' 18 But the small firm premium over the years
1985-1989, this study's sample period, was negative. 119 The finding of
negative significance in this Article, compared to earlier work, is thus
not a mystery but readily interpretable: the portfolio impact of South
African investment restrictions replicates the small firm effect, which
was adverse to fund beneficiaries during the late 1980s. Hence, if states
with South African investment restrictions do not understand their ef-
fect on portfolio investments, then they are taking on more risk in their
pension fund portfolios than they desire. This finding is also consistent
with the findings of a recent unpublished study on the impact of South
Africa-free investment. 120 Since the other studies use market values,
the statistical significance of the South Africa variable in the regression,
like the significance of the asset allocation variable, increases confi-
dence in the use of a book value measure for portfolio performance
and, consequently, in the conclusion that fund performance is signifi-
cantly related to board composition.
117. See Blake R. Grossman & William F. Sharpe, Financial Implications of South
African Divestment, Fin. Analysts J., July-Aug. 1986, at 15, 25; Andrew Rudd,
Divestment of South African Equities: How Risky?, J. Portfolio Mgmt., Spring 1979, at
5, 7; Wayne H. Wagner et al., South African Divestment: The Investment Issues, Fin.
Analysts J., Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 14, 15-16.
118. This result is uniform across the studies. See supra note 117 and
accompanying text. If only firms failing to comply with the Sullivan principles are
divested, then there is no perceptible effect on fund performance because the number of
firms excluded is so small. See Grossman & Sharpe, supra note 117, at 28-29.
119. Ibbotson Assocs., Inc., SBBI, Stocks, Bonds, Bills & Inflation 1992 Yearbook
109-10 (1992).
120. See Callan Assocs., Inc., New York State Common Retirement Fund: Impact
of South Africa Free Constraint Domestic Equity Portfolio 2, 8, 14 (Apr. 26, 1990) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
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Although the small-firm effect interpretation of the negative coeffi-
cient on the South African investment restrictions variable is consonant
with the finance literature, there is an alternative characterization of
this result that is consistent with this Article's thesis. States that are
willing to impose South African investment restrictions on their pen-
sion funds may also be more likely to pressure funds to engage in other
forms of social investing. The South African investment dummy varia-
ble, in this perspective, is best understood as a proxy for the exertion of
political influence on fund decisions, and as with the board composi-
tion variable, we find that such interference lowers returns.
Little can be concluded concerning the effect of corporate govern-
ance activism on fund performance. The shareholder activism dummy
variable, while positive in all but one regression, is always insignificant.
There is also no strong relationship between fund activism and board
composition. The correlation between the proportion of the board that
is elected and the dummy variable indicating fund activism is -. 23. A
logistic regression, which estimates the probability that a fund is active
in corporate governance given its board composition failed to uncover
a significant relationship between those variables. 121 This suggests that
a fund only needs one political entrepreneur to become an activist
fund.
It is most probable, however, that the failure to find a relation be-
tween activism and fund performance and between board composition
and activism is due to limitations of the available data. The activism
dummy variable is only a rough approximation of funds' activism in
corporate governance, which limits the power of statistical tests. More-
over, there is little variation in the activism variable: there are only thir-
teen funds for which the activist dummy variable is not equal to zero.
The noisiness in the activism variable makes it understandable, as a
purely technical matter, that no significance is observed.
The regression model provides a rough estimate of the welfare loss
imposed by having a non-independent board and by mandated social
investment policies. As summarized in Table 4, the estimated loss of
investment income attributable to the absence of an independent board
amounts to over $15 billion during the period 1985-1989.122 If the
121. See G.S. Maddala, Limited-dependent and Qualitative Variables in
Econometrics 22-27 (1983). The logit model was estimated separately for each year of
data, 1985-1989, and for the average across the five years, because I was unable to
estimate properly the error structure for a nonlinear panel data model. The results were
indistinguishable across the annual and averaged regressions: the coefficient on the
board composition variable ranged between -2.54 and -2.58, with a standard error
ranging between 1.67 and 1.69; and the log-likelihood ratio ranged between 2.99 and
3.06, which is significant at the 10% level under a two-tailed test.
122. The coefficients on the board composition variable and the social investment
legislation and South African investment restriction dummy variables are interpretable
as the percentage change in fund return from such practices. Multiplying the total asset
value of the pension funds with no elected board members by 1.3%o (the estimated
830 [Vol. 93:795
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TABLE 4. ESTIMATED WEALTH Loss, 1985-89 (IN THOUSANDS)
Variable Estimate 95% Confidence Interval
IndepBd -$15,018,729 $2,416,860 to -$32,454,320
Econdev -$ 5,563,711 $3,034,362 to -$14,161,787
Subtotal: -$20,582,440 $5,451,223 to -$46,616,107
SAfrica -$ 7,641,225 -$1,736,900 to -$13,367,650
Total: -$28,223,665 $3,714,322 to -$59,983,757
Note: Estimated using full model regression reported in table 3A and book value of
total assets of, respectively, 32 funds with no elected board members, 24 funds
subject to legislated encouragement of social investment and 25 funds subject to
South African investment restrictions.
effects of social investment and South African investment restrictions
(estimated losses of $5.6 billion and $7.6 billion respectively) are com-
bined with that related to board structure, the total estimated loss is
over $28 billion. Even if the effect of the South African investment re-
strictions is excluded because the small firm effect was negative in the
sample period and would have been positive in earlier years, $20.6 bil-
lion is a meaningful loss of income by anyone's calculation, although it
is, of course, a small fraction of total public pension fund holdings.
The statistical findings-the insignificance of the relationship be-
tween fund performance and activism, the significant positive relation-
ship between performance and independent board composition, and
the negative relationship between performance and statutory policies
of social investment-reinforce the anecdotal accounts describing polit-
ical interference in public pension fund decisions. Together, they indi-
cate that there are serious limits on the expected benefits of increased
shareholder activism by public pension funds. Although public funds
may not go so far as to introduce non-value-maximizing shareholder
proposals in response to political pressures, they may well recede from
engaging in value-maximizing corporate governance activities. For ex-
ample, rather than offering value-maximizing proposals, they could in-
stead endorse management actions that are not in the interests of other
shareholders and are costly to taxpayers and fund beneficiaries.
C. Proxy Voting by Public and Private Funds
Another important issue concerning public pension fund activism
coefficient of the board composition variable), and that of the funds subject to the social
investment and South Africa investment restriction legislation by 0.52% and 1.02%
respectively (the respective dummy variables' coefficient) generates a measure of the
losses to these funds. Table 4 also provides the 95% confidence interval for the
estimated wealth effect. This interval is obtained by adding to and subtracting from the
coefficient the standard error of the estimate of the coefficient multiplied by 1.96 (the
critical value of a t-statistic at a 5% significance level for large samples). See Robert S.
Pindyck & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometric Models & Economic Forecasts 57 (3d ed.
1991).
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is whether public funds vote their shares differently from other institu-
tional investors and are therefore more effective monitors of manage-
ment. Private pension funds typically delegate voting authority to
external fund managers. Public pension funds are more likely to man-
age their portfolios internally and hence to vote their own shares, but
even when they use external fund managers, they retain voting author-
ity more frequently than private funds.123 The core basis for commen-
tators' emphasis on public funds' activism in corporate governance is
the widely-shared belief that there are significant differences in the vot-
ing policies of public pension funds and other institutional investors,
with a decided pro-management bias in the private sector. 124
The Investor Responsibility Research Center's (IRRC) annual
surveys of institutional investors' proxy voting on corporate govern-
ance and social responsibility issues provide a database for investigat-
ing the hypothesis that voting differs across institutional investors. The
corporate governance surveys ask whether institutions generally vote
for, against, or consider case-by-case a broad range of governance is-
sues that have been proposed by management or shareholders in the
current and preceding proxy seasons. The social responsibility surveys
ask institutions how they voted on specific shareholder proposals.
One important caveat on the use of the IRRC data is that we do not
know how representative IRRC respondents are of the population of
public and private fund managers. Because most respondents prefer
anonymity, IRRC reports responses by category of institution. If IRRG
respondents are more interested in matters of corporate governance
and social responsibility than the typical fund manager-which is not an
implausible scenario given that they are willing to take the time to re-
spond to the surveys-then their responses may not be generalizable to
the fund manager population. Moreover, the pool of respondents for
123. This divergent pattern of voting practice has persisted over time, with the
number of public funds retaining voting authority increasing, as reported in the IRRG's
annual institutional investor survey. See Ann Yerger & Elizabeth Lightfoot, IRRC,
Voting by Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance Issues 1991, at 59-60
(1991) (68% of responding public funds vote all of their shares compared to 40% of
private funds, whereas only 16%o of public funds retain voting authority for less than
25%o of their shares compared to half of private funds); Jeffrey W. Biersach, IRRC,
Voting by Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance Issues in the 1990 Proxy
Season 5 (1990) [hereinafter Voting 1990] (44%o of responding private funds delegate
all or most of voting power; 65% of responding public funds retain all authority);
Lauren G. Krasnow, IRRC, Voting by Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance
Issues in the 1989 Proxy Season 6 (1989) (85% of responding public funds retain all
voting authority); Paul R. Bergin, IRRC, Voting by Institutional Investors on Corporate
Governance Issues in the 1988 Proxy Season 58 (1988) (half of responding public funds
retain all voting authority); Sharon Marcil & Peg O'Hara, IRRG, Voting by Institutional
Investors on Corporate Governance Issues in the 1987 Proxy Season 46 (1987)
[hereinafter 1987 Voting] (only 2 of 9 private funds vote their own proxies whereas only
8 of 22 public funds delegate voting authority for all or most of their shares).
124. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 3, at 242-43.
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the social responsibility issue survey is even more likely to be unrepre-
sentative of the institutional investor population because, unlike the
corporate governance survey, it is sent only to IRRC subscribers. De-
spite these limitations, this database is the best that is publicly available
for evaluating claims that voting differs across institutional investors.
The IRRC's 1990 corporate governance survey solicited responses
on sixteen varieties of shareholder proposals and twenty-four manage-
ment proposals. 125 The largest category of responses concerns an-
titakeover defenses, which are surely a principal cause of the increase in
shareholder activism that began in the late 1980s and remain at the
center of current interest in the role of institutional investors in corpo-
rate governance. A simultaneous development also fostering fund
activism was the increased use by large funds of portfolio indexing-a
passive investment strategy that tracks the performance of the market
as a whole by holding the stocks in a broad-based index, such as the
Standard and Poor's 500.126 A fund with an indexed portfolio cannot
divest shares of a poorly performing company that is in the index. Such
a locking-in of equity investments is believed to make the fund manager
place greater emphasis on activism in corporate governance than would
an active fund manager, because the passive manager can no longer
follow the Wall Street rule of selling shares when he or she disagrees
with corporate management or is disappointed with firm performance.
However, even for the passive index fund manager, the cost of corpo-
rate governance activism is likely to outweigh the pro rata benefit for all
but the very largest investors.
The survey respondents' voting policies are indicated in Table
5.127 Private pension funds are grouped with investment managers be-
cause the private fund sample size is small and commentators generally
view these groups as having similar conflicts of interest with manage-
ment.128 Since the results of a policy of case-by-case votes are obvi-
ously unavailable, such policy responses are excluded from the analysis.
The data appear, upon visual inspection, to support the hypothesis
125. Only the 1990 corporate governance survey provides usable data, because, in
contrast to other survey years, it includes information on both the number of
respondents as well as the proportion of responses for and against issues. The
additional information identifying the number of respondents is important because we
must be able to adjust for sample sizes in order to determine whether different response
proportions across public and private institutions are significant.
126. See Steve Hemmerick, Fund Jumps on Indexing, Pensions & Investment Age,
Oct. 16, 1989, at 1.
127. The respondents are 24 public pension funds, 39 investment managers and six
private pension funds (only half of the private funds responding to the overall survey).
See Voting 1990, supra note 123. Presumably, the other six private funds delegated
voting decisions and therefore had no policy to report. An additional 24 nonprofit
institutions-foundations, universities and church groups-participated in the survey;
the policies of such respondents are not included in the discussion or in the statistical
tests.
128. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 3, at 242-43.
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TABLE 5. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS' PROXY VOTING POLICIES
A. Management ProposalsType.
Anti-greenmail prov.
Approve poison pill
Authorize blank stock
Eliminate shareholder-called special
meetings
Eliminate written consents
Increase blank stock
Increase common stock
Indemnification prov.
Limited liability
Restructuring
Restructuring w/antitakeover prov.
Reincorporation
Reincorporation w/antitakeover prov.
Staggered board
Staggered board w/antitakeover prov.
Stakeholder prov.
Stock Option Plans:
Accelerated/cash-out
Discounted exercise
Omnibus plan
Non-employee directors
Pyramiding
Underwater exchange
Supermajority voting req.
Unequal voting shares
B. Shareholder Proposals
PubF PubA PubC InvF InvA InvC Prob.
16 2 6 30 2 13 .456
0 13 11 1 24 20 .658
0 18 6 7 18 20 .015
0 20 4 3 23 19 .171
0 20 4 2 21 22 .280
1 15 8 7 18 20 .092
6 0 18 16 1 28 1.00
21 n.a. n.a. 32 n.a. n.a.
18 n.a. n.a. 31 n.a. n.a.
1 2 20 3 3 39 .595
0 13 11 0 16 29
1 4 19 5 2 38 .121
0 15 9 3 16 26 .162
n.a. 17 n.a. 10 20 15 *
0 18 4 n.a. 24 n.a.
0 11 13 5 15 26 .141
1 9 14 12 8 24 .011
2 15 7 8 16 21 .111
2 6 16 10 2 32 .015
7 6 11 23 4 17 .042
3 10 10 12 10 22 .070
1 16 7 8 14 21 .028
0 18 6 2 28 15 .386
1 17 6 3 26 16 .502
Type. PubF PubA PubC InvF InvA InvC Prob.
Anti-greenmail prov. 2"-2 - 0 2 31 0 14
Confidential voting 23 0 1 27 9 9 .008Cumulative voting 14 8 1 15 19 11 .124
Establish shareholder advisory
committee 8 11 5 4 16 22 .125Minimum share ownership for directors 6 14 4 10 21 12 .681Outside director term limit 2 17 5 2 24 17 .568
Opt-out of Delaware anti-takeover
statute 18 2 4 17 6 22 .169Preemptive rights 11 12 1 7 23 15 .058Prohibit golden parachutes 16 1 7 14 7 24 .045Redeem poison pill 13 0 10 18 4 23 .140Reduce supermajority voting req. 19 2 2 19 5 21 .267Reform voting count 21 1 1 13 3 29 .192Repeal staggered board 19 2 2 23 8 14 .134
Vote on golden parachutes 19 0 5 21 8 16 .011
Vote on poisonpills 19 1 4 28 2 15 .651Vote on targeted stock placements 21 1 1 14 6 25 .035
Note: PubF = number of public pension funds with general policy of supporting
proposal; PubA = number of public pension funds with general policy of opposing
proposal; PubC = number of public pension funds with policy on proposal
determined case-by-case; InvF = number of private pension funds and investment
managers with general policy of supporting proposal; InvA = number of private
pension funds and investment managers with general policy of opposing proposal;
InvC = number of private pension funds and investment managers wit policy onproposal determined case-by-case; n.a. = not available because proportion of
responses in indicated category and case-by-case policies not reported in survey;
Prob. = significance level of test statistic, for differences across investors in policy
of support or of opposition to proposal, which is chi-square or Fisher's exact test
when more than 25percent of cells have expected frequencies less than 5; * = tests
run for all possible permutations of missing data on public pension funds and 4 of 5
tests insignificant; ** = tests run for all possible permutations of missing data on
private pension funds and 3 of 3 insignificant.
Source: Jeffrey W. Biersach, IRRC, Voting by Institutional Investors on Corporate
Governance Issues in the 1990 Proxy Season (1990).
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in the literature that there is a difference in public and private fund
managers' voting. The proportion of public pension funds supporting
shareholder proposals and opposing management proposals is.higher
than that of private funds in all but three cases: management proposals
to increase the shares of common stock, and shareholder proposals to
require minimum stock ownership for directors and to prohibit green-
mail.129 There is, however, a simple test of the hypothesis that public
fund managers are more likely to oppose management proposals and
less likely to oppose shareholder proposals than private fund managers.
This involves tabulating response frequencies across institutional inves-
tor groups and comparing the resulting distribution of voting policies
with a random distribution.13 0 If the test statistic produced by this
comparison is significant (i.e., using conventional levels, .05 or less),
the null hypothesis of no difference across the two groups of investors
is rejected in favor of the hypothesis in question, that there is a
difference.
Table 5 provides the results of cross-tabulations of voting policies
for and against proposals by institutional investor type. 13 1 The last col-
umn, labeled "prob.," reports the probability that the observed distri-
bution of responses is the same as that which would occur by chance
(this is the significance of the test statistic). In the vast majority of cases
(twenty-nine of thirty-eight proposals), we cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that voting policies are the same across institutional investors:
the observed differences in proportions are equivalent to what would
129. If the case-by-case policy responses are included in the database, then the
public fund percentages are higher in all but the proposals to increase common stock.
If, however, the responses of private pension funds and investment firms are examined
separately, then the relevant proportions of private pension fund responses are equal to
or higher than those of public pension funds in ten cases, and those of investment firms,
in four cases (six and two, respectively, when case-by-case policy responses are included
in the base).
There is one curious inconsistency in these data. While public funds always support
shareholder anti-greenmail proposals, 11 %7 always oppose management anti-greenmail
proposals, a higher proportion than private funds and investment firms. But these
proposals do not differ substantively. One possible explanation is that opposition to
management proposals has an ideological, as well as a substantive, component: public
fund managers may vote against management proposals more frequently than private
fund managers simply because they have an anti-establishment bias, which translates
into a preference for opposing corporate management regardless of a proposal's merits,
analogous to differences in the political sphere, where Democrats are more likely than
Republicans to opt for government solutions.
130. The test statistic comparing the observed and predicted frequencies is a chi-
square. See, e.g., Sidney Siegel & N.John Castellan,Jr., Nonparametric Statistics for the
Behavioral Sciences 111-14, 123-24 (2d ed. 1988). Where the cell expected
frequencies are small (less than 5%), Fisher's test (one-tailed) is used instead. See id. at
123-24, 104-11.
131. I assume that respondents answer each question separately. This assumption
is necessary for statistical testing, because it is impossible to determine how to correct
the standard errors of estimation if responses are clustered.
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be observed if voting policies were randomly assigned to investor
types. 132 This finding is consistent with a recent study of the impact of
institutional holdings on the performance of firms that make takeover
bids. Despite expecting the effect of public pension funds to be posi-
tive and that of private fund managers and other financial institutions
to be negative for the same reason that voting practices are expected to
differ-conflicts of interest-the researchers found no difference; there
was, in fact, an inverse relationship between bidding-firm performance
and the holdings of both types of institutions.13 3
Alfred Conard cites the IRRC's 1987 corporate governance voting
survey as providing evidence of significant voting differences across
public and private firms.134 However, Conard did not perform any sta-
tistical tests to bolster this conclusion. In only two categories of 1987
proxy proposals, those to increase the number of shares of authorized
stock and those to stagger the election of directors to the board, is the
difference in proportion so visibly striking as to suggest that it may be
statistically significant. Conard considers these proposals to be an-
titakeover measures, but such a classification is far from obvious.
There are bona fide, non-takeover-related reasons to undertake each
policy. Newly authorized shares can be used in acquisitions or sold to
raise capital, and staggering board membership maintains continuity
and enhances the stability of board decision-making. Moreover, the
analysis of the 1990 IRRC survey data, where statistical tests can be
undertaken, does not reveal a significant difference between public and
private funds in voting on proposals to increase common stock or for
proposals to stagger boards, especially when the proposal is offered in
conjunction with other antitakeover provisions.
The observed difference in voting policies across public and pri-
vate fund managers in the 1990 data is significant for five management
proposals and four shareholder proposals. In six of these nine cases,
the majority of private funds and investment managers follow the same
voting policy as the majority of public funds, a pattern that undercuts
the finding of a statistically significant difference in voting policy. In
addition, voting differences are more exacerbated on issues not involv-
ing changes in control, the quintessential agency problem where oppo-
sition to management has the most severe consequences and thus
conflicts of interest might be thought to matter most: four of the five
management proposals that public funds oppose more frequently than
132. If the statistical test is undertaken by grouping all proposals together, then the
difference in voting practice is significant. I do not put much credence in this result,
however, because it is likely to be an artifact of the technique-statistical significance is
more likely to be found when the number of observations increases.
133. See Chuan-Yang Hwang et al., Institutional Investors, Corporate Decision
Making, and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions 21 (1992)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
134. See Alfred F. Conard, Fiduciary Obligation of the Asset Manager, in Proxy
Voting, supra note 17, at 86, 100-01.
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private funds and investment managers involve changes to stock option
plans rather than the elimination of antitakeover defenses. In fact, the
pattern of the general findings on governance proposals persists in
proxy fights, the voting context most directly related to management
discipline by control battles. In the two 1990 proxy fights for which the
IRRC provides voting data, there is no significant difference in the vot-
ing of public pension funds and investment managers: both groups
supported management. 13 5 These data indicate that commentators' in-
tuition that public and private funds' proxy votes meaningfully differ on
corporate governance issues is not well-founded.
Because IRRC corporate governance surveys only report general
voting policies that cannot be matched with votes on specific proposals,
I also examined whether voting differs across institutions on social re-
sponsibility issues, where actual votes are available. The hypothesis of
interest is that public funds will support social responsibility share-
holder proposals more frequently than do private fund managers, par-
ticularly because they are subject to greater political pressure to factor
non-financial social policy considerations into their decisions. In an
effort to retain at least temporal comparability with the corporate gov-
ernance voting policy data, a random sample of votes on social respon-
sibility issues in the 1990 proxy season was constructed.136 Votes on
proposals in the same IRRC issue category are tallied together for hy-
pothesis testing. Abstentions are counted as no votes because corpo-
rate voting rules frequently require either a majority of the shares
present (in person or by proxy) or a majority of the outstanding shares
entitled to vote for a proposal's adoption.1 37
IRRC's categorization of anonymous respondents in the social re-
135. The battles were over Armstrong World Industries and USX; the voting
breakdown, with the test statistic's significance in parentheses, were as follows: for
Armstrong, 73% of public funds for management, 77% of investment managers (.715);
and for USX, 67% of public funds for management, 82% of investment managers
(.164).
136. The source of votes is Krista M. Johnson, IRRC, How Institutions Voted on
Social Policy Shareholder Resolutions in the 1990 Proxy Season (1990). The 1990
survey reports votes on 88 proposals on South Africa, 22 on Northern Ireland, 15 on
environmental issues, and a miscellaneous set of 39 other proposals involving, among
other issues, animal welfare, military production facilities conversion, nuclear power,
and tobacco. A random sample of 41 votes was stratified by proposal category and
selected using a random numbers table. For a description of the proposals included in
the sample, see Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate
Governance Reconsidered tbl. 5 (1992) (Yale Law School, Center for Studies in Law,
Economics, and Pfiblic Policy, Working Paper #159, on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
137. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 216(2) (1991); Rev. Model Business Corp.
Act § 8.63(a) (1991) (ratification of interested director action). Although the
conventional rule treats abstentions as negative votes, the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act changes that rule, and does not count abstentions as votes. A
transaction is instead treated as approved if the votes cast for it exceed the votes cast
against it. See Rev. Model Business Corp. Act § 7.25 official cmt. 4 (1991).
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sponsibility surveys differs from that of the corporate governance
surveys: all pension funds (public, private, union, and non-profit) are
grouped together, while investment firms are classified separately from
banks and insurance companies.1 8 Given the hypothesis of interest,
that public and private fund managers' incentives, and hence votes, dif-
fer, it would be inappropriate to compare aggregated pension fund
votes with those of financial firms. This is not an insurmountable diffi-
culty, however, because several public pension funds chose to be iden-
tified. The hypothesis is therefore tested by cross-tabulating votes of
the identified public pension funds and all investment firms.1 9 It is
impossible to determine how, if at all, this approach biases the results.
To do so one would need information concerning the motivation for
requests of anonymity-for example, whether public funds are more or
less likely to request anonymity when they vote against social responsi-
bility proposals-and that information is not available. But it reinforces
the earlier caveat that care must be exercised in extrapolating from this
sample's behavior to the fund manager population.
Table 6 reports the cross-tabulation results for voting on social re-
sponsibility issues. There are no significant differences on social re-
sponsibility votes across public and private fund managers except for
proposals on South Africa. Although this result may be due to the sam-
ple-it comes from the IRRC subscriber pool, which may consist of
investors more concerned about social issues than the average institu-
tional investor, and within this group, the public funds are limited to
those willing to be identified-it does corroborate the finding of scant
differences across investors in corporate governance proxy voting poli-
cies, where the respondent pool is not as circumscribed. The differ-
ence in voting practices for South African divestment proposals is
consistent with the possibility that public funds experience more polit-
ical pressure on their decisions than private funds. But if this explains
the difference, then, one must ask, why is the difference only significant
for such proposals? One possible explanation is that investment in
South Africa is a more salient political issue than the concerns raised by
other proposals. However, the funds in the South Africa proposal sam-
ple are not located in states with South African investment restriction
statutes (otherwise they would not own shares in companies doing busi-
ness there), which suggests that the South Africa investment issue may
well not be of heightened political interest in those states.
The assertion that public and private fund proxy voting differs sig-
nificantly simply does not hold up in these data. This is evidence that
differences in the sources of pressure on public and private funds do
138. There were 94 respondents, 49 of which desired anonymity. See Johnson,
supra note 136, at 1.
139. There is no difference in results if identified public fund votes are compared to
votes of investment firms only, as reported in the text, or to votes of all private financial
managers (investment firms, banks, and insurance companies combined).
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TABLE 6. VOTING ON SociAL RESPONSIBILITY ISSUES
A. South Africa Proposals (22)
Vote totaL" Yes: 68 public pensions; 18 investment firms
No: 21 public pensions; 89 investment firms
Prob.: .000
B. Northern Ireland Proposals (6)
Vote total: Yes: 7 public pensions; 7 investment firms
No: 22 public pensions; 32 investment firms
Prob.: .532
C. Environmental Issues (4)
Vote totaL Yes: 5 public pensions; 2 investment firms
No: 18 public pensions; 18 investment firms
Prob.: .269
D. Miscellaneous Other Issues (9)
Vote totak Yes: 8 public pensions; 6 investment firms
No: 34 public pensions; 45 investment firms
Prob.: .328
E. All Non-South Africa Proposals (19)
Vote total: Yes: 20 public pensions; 15 investment firms
No: 74 public pensions; 95 investment firms
Prob.: .149
F. All Proposals, including South Africa (41)
Vote total: Yes: 88 public pensions; 33 investment firms
No: 95 public pensions; 184 investment firms
Prob.: .000
Note: Prob. = significance level of test statistic, which is chi-square or Fisher's exact
test where more than 25 percent of cells have expected frequencies less than 5.
Source: Krista M. Johnson, IRRC, How Institutions Voted on Social Policy
Shareholder Resolutions in the 1990 Proxy Season (1990).
not necessarily translate into differences in voting practices, a finding
that leads to two conclusions. First, it calls into question the literature's
assumption that private financial institutions have greater conflicts of
interest with other shareholders than do public funds. Second, assum-
ing that the common voting policies of both types of funds maximize
stock value, it suggests that political pressure on public funds may be
principally directed to investment rather than voting decisions. How-
ever, the cross-tabulations of institutional voting do not answer the
question whether public pension funds' proxy voting is susceptible to
political pressure. To do so, it would be necessary to disaggregate the
IRRC data and match actual votes with fund performance and the vari-
ables serving as proxies for political pressure, such as board composi-
tion; such data are not, however, available. More important, if public
funds increase their corporate governance activities, then the political
pressure that has been directed at investment decisions will most likely
be refocused on voting, and voting practices may well turn out to differ
across investors in the future.
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II. SOLUTIONS TO THE POLITICIZATION OF PUBLIC PENSION FUND
INVESTMENTS
Several reforms to the administration of public pension plans
could mitigate the demonstrated effect of political pressure on fund in-
vestment and voting decisions. Some reforms are better at protecting
investment practices and others at insulating voting practices, but none
are perfect solutions to the problem. The most effective proposal-
switching public pensions from a defined benefit to a defined contribu-
tion plan structure-is also the most drastic, since it solves the problem
by eliminating public fund managers' role in corporate governance.
The adoption of such a proposal would thus shift the focus of attention
back to the private sector and, in particular, to the incentives of mutual
fund managers to engage in effective corporate governance.
A. Reforming Public Pension Fund Boards
The results of this Article's statistical analysis suggest one reform
to mitigate political influence on public fund investments: ensuring
that fund boards have beneficiary-elected members. Others have at
times made such a proposal.' 40 In fact, in response to the poor per-
formance of local investments made by the Kansas Public Employees
Retirement System detailed earlier, the board was expanded to include
two beneficiary-elected members beyond the existing seven appoin-
tees. 14 1 The data do not demonstrate that a wholly-elected board is
necessary, nor whether some specified proportion of elected members
is optimal, because the regressions did not uncover diminishing returns
to elected board membership. However, if elected members have less
investment experience than ex officio members or political appointees
who are chosen by an expertise criterion, then the more politically-
affiliated members' ability to influence investment decisions may well
be greater than that of the members elected by beneficiaries.1 42
There are, however, several reasons why disparate expertise on a
board with beneficiary-elected members should not be a substantial
problem. First, as a practical matter, the formal financial expertise of
board members does not appear to be a factor in fund performance.
The regressions discussed in Part I.B were reestimated using the pro-
portion of members required by statute to have investment expertise as
the board composition variable. The coefficient on the board composi-
tion variable was not significant and the wrong sign-negative. 43 Sec-
140. See, e.g., Kohlmeier, supra note 4 at 278-83.
141. See Christine Philip, Kansas Takes Up Reforms, Pensions & Investments, Feb.
22, 1993, at 32. See also supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
142. See Terry Williams, Turmoil at Atlanta Fund, Pensions & Investments, Sept.
14, 1992, at 6, 28 (elected members of Atlanta's pension fund express frustration and
anger at inability to evaluate investment choices of x officio member, who was the city's
chief financial officer).
143. The estimated equation (standard errors in parentheses) is:
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ond, it is questionable to assume that employees and retirees would not
consider a candidate's expertise if experience mattered. The more re-
alistic assumption is that voters will be sufficiently informed (by their
unions if not by their own self-interest), or at least will become so over
time, and will choose individuals who are more literate in finance if in-
experienced representatives adversely affect their interests. Third,
structural protections can be adopted in conjunction with board reform
to limit any problems that would be presented by having financially-
inexperienced elected board members. For example, states could re-
quire that all or some number of elected board members meet mini-
mum expertise requirements, or they could provide board members
with rudimentary financial training. Finally, they could follow the ex-
ample of some states and establish advisory councils composed of indi-
viduals with investment expertise to provide recommendations to fund
boards concerning investment strategy. 144
Although differential expertise will not, therefore, limit the effec-
tiveness of fund board reform, increasing the number of independent
board members may not completely extirpate political influence on
public funds' decision-making. Although the statistical analysis indi-
cates that boards with beneficiary-elected members perform better than
more politicized ones, such boards may still be subject to more political
pressure than private funds. In fiscally troubled times, even independ-
ent board members may be unable to prevent political interference in
fund decisions and, as mentioned earlier, they may find the courts to be
less than vigorous supporters of their efforts to resist political uses of
pension fund assets. 145
B. Applying ERISA's Fiduciary Standards to Public Funds
Another approach to the problem of political influence on public
pension fund decision-making would be to extend ERISA's fiduciary
standard to public funds. This need not be achieved by preemptive
federal legislation: states can enact the ERISA regime on their own. As
noted earlier, most commentators attribute the absence of social invest-
ing in the private pension fund sector to the mandates of ERISA and its
interpretation by the Department of Labor.146 However, applying
Earnings = .0722 + .0220 NongovSec - .0136 AppExp.
(.0055) (.0107) (.0084)
This is a crude test of the relation of expertise and performance, however, because
the board composition variable does not take account of individuals whose membership
on a board does not depend on an expertise criterion, such as state financial officers, but
who nevertheless are likely to have investment experience.
144. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 215.444 (West 1989); N.Y. Retire. & Soc. Sec. Law
§ 423 (McKinney 1987).
145. See supra notes 24, 64 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., Langbein & Posner, supra note 61, at 96-98 (discussing DOL's
position that ERISA prohibits trustees from investing for any object other than
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ERISA will not resolve all of the problems identified in this Article.
Although it would alleviate pressure to engage in social investing, it
would not eliminate political pressure on voting decisions. ERISA per-
mits plan sponsors to select the fund's investment managers or to be
the fund manager themselves, and hence to exercise authority over vot-
ing fund shares.' 47 ERISA therefore tolerates, indeed incorporates, fi-
duciary conflicts of interest in fund decisions. 148 Even if ERISA were
amended to remove fund administration from plan sponsors and place
voting decisions in the hands of external money managers, the struc-
tural conflict would not necessarily be eliminated because outside in-
vestment managers understand the power of appointment: if their
voting policies displease fund sponsors, they may well be replaced.149
C. Mandating Passive Investment Strategies
Increased use of passive (indexed) investment strategies will also
reduce the opportunities for state officials to pressure public pension
fund managers to engage in social investing or non-value-maximizing
share voting.' 5 0 Passive investment management would eliminate the
ability of public funds to engage in the most egregious economically-
targeted types of social investments. A separate advantage of this ap-
proach is its impact on portfolio value: there is no evidence that the
benefits of active portfolio management outweigh the costs. A uniform
finding of a large body of research is that pension funds' active money
managers are consistently outperformed by stock market indexes; these
managers tend to subtract value from a portfolio, rather than to en-
achieving the highest return at the proffered risk level); see also Stein, supra note 17, at
44, supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
147. See ERISA § 408(c)(3) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1988)).
148. See John H. Langbein & Bruce A. Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law
553, 599 (1990); Langbein, supra note 60, at 129, 136-37. In fact, as Fischel and
Langbein contend, the employer's interest should be considered in investment and
voting decisions because in defined benefit plans, where pension benefits are
guaranteed, the employer bears the risk of poor fund performance. See Fischel &
Langbein, supra note 21, at 1112-13. For a more detailed discussion of defined benefit
plans, see infra note 162 and accompanying text. Moreover, if employers could not
exercise control over plans, they may be less likely to provide pension benefits to their
employees. See Langbein, supra note 60, at 136.
149. In Avon Products Letter, U.S. Dep't of Labor Letter on Proxy Voting by Plan
Fiduciaries (Feb. 23, 1988), reprinted in Langbein & Wolk, supra note 148, at 562-64,
the Department of Labor found that a plan sponsor's explicit direction of a fund
manager's proxy voting was a violation of ERISA, as the sponsor had delegated, rather
than reserved to itself, the shares' voting rights. However, as Langbein contends,
enforcement of the Avon Products Letter standard is "essentially futile," because
constructing paper records that establish voting guidelines and respect fiduciary
independence will not eliminate the power that derives from manager selection. See
Langbein, supra note 60, at 136-37.
150. Cf. John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-
Investment Law, 1976 Am. B. Found. Res.J. 1.
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hance it. 15 1
There are, however, two limitations on the effectiveness of the in-
dexing proposal. First, a totally passive investment strategy will not
maximize fund value because some asset classes necessary for portfolio
diversification, such as real estate and venture capital, are not easily
indexed and hence not appropriate for passive investment manage-
ment. These asset categories are also often social investment targets
(i.e., purchasing local real estate for development or investing in small
local start-up businesses). This difficulty does not, however, implicate
the corporate governance issues of concern in this Article because such
asset classes do not entail shareholder voting, although it does indicate
that the problem of pressure to engage in social investing will not be
easily eliminated. Second, and more important, shares held in pas-
sively managed plans must still be voted. Hence the possibility of polit-
ical influence on fund voting remains. This difficulty can be reduced if
funds hire outsiders to manage indexed investments and then delegate
voting to those managers. But, as noted in the discussion of the ERISA
approach to the problem, there is slippage in such a solution because it
is still possible for a board to exert pressure on external managers' vot-
ing decisions through its appointment power.
D. Constitutionalizing Fund Board Independence
An alternative strategy, which public pension funds have recently
undertaken to prevent raids on their assets by fiscally distressed state
governments, is to constitutionalize the independence of fund boards.
In reaction to the 1992 legislative assault on CalPERS discussed in Part
1,152 an initiative entitled the "California Pension Protection Act" was
placed on the ballot to amend the state constitution and vest fiduciary
power and obligation, including investment management and system
administration, in the retirement fund board exclusively. 53 Another
provision in the initiative stated that the board's fiduciary duty to its
participants and beneficiaries has precedence over any other duty, such
as a duty to employers and taxpayers to minimize administration costs.
151. See, e.g., Josef Lakonishok et al., The Structure and Performance of the
Money Management Industry, in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:
Microeconomics 1992, at 339, 378 (Martin N. Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1992)
(finding pension fund equity managers subtract rather than add value relative to the S&P
500 Index's performance); Burton G. Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street
199-200 (5th ed. 1990) (70%a of pension fund equity managers outperformed by S&P
500 Index in fifteen-year period ending Dec. 31, 1989). In contrast to the studies of
pension fund managers' performance, some studies of the performance of mutual funds
have found that active "funds' risk-adjusted performance, net of expenses, is statistically
indistinguishable from that of index funds." Richard A. Ippolito, On Studies of Mutual
Fund Performance, 1962-1991, 49 Fin. Analysts J., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 42, 49.
152. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
153. See Prop. 162, 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West); SJ. Res. 28, 43d Leg., 2d Sess.,
1992 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. (West).
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Finally, the initiative required voter approval of any legislative change
in the composition of any retirement board with elected members. An
initiative to protect the assets and independence of the public pension
fund was also proposed in Oklahoma. Voters approved both
initiatives. 154
Although constitutional protection of the integrity of public pen-
sion funds has obvious popular appeal, like the proposal to apply
ERISA's fiduciary standard to public funds, it is ultimately an inade-
quate solution. Constitutionally enshrined board independence pre-
vents the more flagrant forms of legislative interference in fund affairs,
such as redeployment of fund assets or changes in board composition.
It also more successfully bonds the state to honor its contracts because
it is more difficult to renege on constitutional than statutory commit-
ments. However, it does not eliminate state officials' ability to influ-
ence politically sensitive board members on decisions regarding social
investments or voting policies that aid local firms' managers at the ex-
pense of fund beneficiaries.
E. Switching to Defined Contribution Plans
The most promising reform for curtailing political pressure on
public pension funds is, in my judgment, to reorganize state retirement
plans as defined contribution rather than defined benefit plans. A de-
fined benefit plan guarantees a pension according to a formula that ad-
justs benefits based on years of service and final salary that is
independent of the value of the assets in the plan. In contrast, a pen-
sion received in a defined contribution plan consists of financial assets
that accrue in employees' accounts from employer and employee con-
tributions over their working lives. The standard account choices that
private employers offer employees participating in defined contribution
plans are bond and stock index funds, managed by reputable, typically
national, mutual funds, and guaranteed insurance contracts (GICs),
which are sold by life insurance companies and promise a specified re-
turn.155 Reorganizing public pension plans as defined contribution
plans, following the private sector model, transfers control over invest-
ments into the hands of individual employees from pension fund
boards.
With decisional power diffused across numerous plan beneficiaries,
the likelihood that political pressure will push substantial pension fund
assets into high-risk, low-return projects decreases. Indeed, it is un-
likely that state officials would even try to persuade individual employ-
ees, as opposed to fund boards and their managers, of the wisdom of
154. See Sabine Schramm & Terry Williams, State Voters Approve Pension
Initiatives, Pensions & Investments, Nov. 9, 1992, at 4. The California proposition
passed with a vote of 51%o; the Oklahoma initiative with 67%. See id.
155. See Michael J. Clowes, Fidelity Wins 401(k) Sweepstakes, Pensions &
Investments, Aug. 3, 1992, at 17.
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investing their retirement savings in specific local projects. Even if such
an approach were feasible, public employees would be able to choose,
on an individual basis, whether they wished to subsidize local projects
or other social investments through their pension savings. The em-
ployee alone, not future taxpayers, would bear the cost of such a
choice.
Although it is questionable whether the local investments presently
marketed to fund managers would be in the menu of investment
choices offered employees, such a scenario is not impossible. For ex-
ample, firms could package such projects into portfolios and market
them to public employees, just as money managers have created indi-
vidualized real estate and venture capital portfolios for public funds
that target local investments. 156 Socially responsible investment strate-
gies are currently available to private pension funds, as are union labor-
only real estate portfolios; socially responsible investment funds are
also available to individual investors.1 57 For example, the largest de-
156. Presumably, a minimum number of employees would have to express interest
in the investments to make such marketing feasible. If local projects were in fact offered
among a state's defined contribution plan's investment choices, there might be concern
that employees would somehow be duped into making poor investments in order to
support the local economy. Such a fear would, in my judgment, be misplaced; data on
private firm employees' pension asset choices indicate that, if anything, individuals are
conservative in their pension investment choices and take on too little investment risk.
See Hillary Durgin, Fighting the Conservatives: Companies Moving Education Efforts
into High Gear, Pensions & Investments, July 6, 1992, at 16; Ellen E. Schultz, Passing
the Buck: In New Pension Plans, Companies Are Putting the Onus on Workers, Wall St.
J., July 7, 1992, at Al. It should be noted that the question of suboptimal employee
investment choices is not a long-run problem. Private employers who sponsor defined
contribution plans, for example, have begun to undertake vigorous and ongoing
educational efforts, and firms specializing in providing employee educational services
have sprung up. See Durgin, supra; Ellen E. Schultz, Competition Revolutionizing
Financial Planning, Wall St.J., Sept. 16, 1992, at Cl; Schultz, supra; Curtis Vosti, Firms
Filling the Void on Plan Education, Pensions & Investments, Aug. 3, 1992, at 17. In one
instance, after providing such information, employees' deposits in the most conservative
fund option offered dropped from 40%6 to 28%o of contributions. See Lynda
McDonnell, Firms Doing More to Help Workers Plan Retirement, New Haven Reg., Feb.
1, 1993, at 15. States can therefore implement techniques similar to those employed in
the private sector to provide financial planning assistance to their employees.
157. These funds offer South Africa-free investments, as well as portfolios free of
stock in companies producing tobacco and alcohol products. See Amy Friedman, Field
of Dreams, Fin. Services Wk., Aug. 19, 1991, at 19; Mary G. Moore, "Socially
Responsible" Funds Adopt Global Focus, Fin. Services Wk.,Jan. 13, 1992, at 22. There
are also more innovative investment vehicles, such as socially responsible variable
annuities. See Socially Responsible Stock Portfolio Bows as VA Option, Fin. Services
Wk., Sept. 7, 1992, Retirement Products Supp., at I 13. For examples of union labor
restricted investment pools, see the following Department of Labor (DOL) advisory
opinion letters approving such investments: DOL Advisory Opinion 85-36 A, Re:
Annuity Fund of the Electrical Industry of Long Island (Oct. 23, 1985); DOL Letter to
Theodore R. Groom (Jan. 16, 1981) (Prudential Life Insurance Co. of America pooled
separate account); DOL Letter to James S. Ray (July 8, 1988) (Union Labor Life
Insurance Co. pooled separate account), reproduced in Albany Law School,
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fined contribution plan, TIAA-CREF, which is for college professors
and administrators, offers its members the choice of investing in such a
fund, and there are a number of private funds offering investors similar
portfolios.
Thus in contrast to the other proposals discussed in this section,
the typical defined contribution plan eliminates political pressure on
share voting. A fund board no longer holds any assets, including cor-
porate stock, because all assets are in individual accounts managed by
financial intermediaries, and even the fund beneficiaries hold equity in-
vestments only indirectly via mutual fund investments. Political pres-
sure is, then, not a factor in a defined contribution pension plan
because investment assets are removed from a fund board's control.
Although the investments of public pension fund defined benefit
plans are more frequently managed internally than those of private
plans, public pension systems would in all likelihood use external man-
agers for defined contribution plan accounts, as do most private firms.
It would be difficult for internal management to compete effectively
with the vast number of account choices available in the private sector
because the economies of scale that exist with a defined benefits plan
would no longer be relevant. In fact, an advantage of a defined contri-
bution plan from the employee's perspective is the increase in individ-
ual choice of investment vehicles offered in such a plan. In the private
sector, workers with defined contribution plans have sought increased
investment choice. For example, calls from university faculty members
for additional investment vehicles led universities to provide multiple
alternatives to the traditional TIAA-CREF plan, and CREF itself re-
sponded by substantially expanding its investment products. Employee
demand has also stimulated the recent growth in defined contribution
plans' offerings of international investment options.1 58
The same dynamic of employee demand for multiple investment
options would likely occur in the public sector, resulting not only in
numerous investment choices for employees but also in the external
management of their retirement accounts. The use of external man-
agement for state defined contribution plans could also be mandated in
order to maintain the integrity of the reform proposal. Alternatively, if
internal management was still less costly for the largest states, the fund
boards could be prohibited from exercising voting rights, as is the fed-
eral government's defined contribution retirement system's board. 59
However, even with external management, defined contribution
Economically Targeted Investments by Public Pension Funds 197-206 (Rev. Materials,
Mar. 1991).
158. See Margaret Price, Overseas Options Gaining Popularity: Employee Demand
Behind Growth Surge, Pensions & Investments, Dec. 7, 1992, at 17.
159. See 5 U.S.C. § 84 3 8 (g) (1988). Such a practice would not be sensible for
defined benefit plans because employers bear the risk of poor investments in such plans,
and therefore should be able to exercise decisional authority for a proper matching of
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plans may not be completely insulated from political pressure: state
officials could still attempt to exert pressure through the selection of
the external managers. Of course, such pressure is not unique to a de-
fined contribution plan setting. The board of a defined benefit plan
fund that does not vote its own shares could use its appointment power
to exert pressure on the external investment manager to vote as the
board desires. 160 However, such pressure would not be as significant a
problem for defined contribution plans as for defined benefit plans be-
cause the vast majority of defined contribution plan assets will be in-
vested with national mutual funds or insurance companies. It is not
likely that any one public pension plan will be able to intimidate mutual
fund managers with a viable threat of imposing a devastating financial
penalty from loss of business. Moreover, increased employee involve-
ment in investment decisions provides a further safeguard for defined
contribution plans. If employees are satisfied with a particular external
fund manager, they will object if that investment option is removed and
thereby limit political pressure points in the account manager selection
process.
Proposing such a fundamental change in public retirement plans
implicates broad issues of public policy that are far removed from the
corporate governance debate. Although this Article cannot resolve the
broader debate, it can provide a sense of the policy tradeoffs entailed in
the proposal to shift to defined contribution plans and suggest why, on
balance, there is much to recommend it. There are, in fact, a number
of additional advantages of defined contribution plans over defined
benefit plans besides their effect of removing political interference
from fund administration. The most obvious advantage is that defined
contribution plans safeguard public pension assets from raids by fiscally
troubled states. There are no surplus earnings in a defined contribu-
tion plan because all fund revenues and income are deposited in indi-
vidual employee accounts. In addition, annual contribution levels do
not depend on actuarial assumptions and states therefore cannot re-
duce promised payments by changing accounting conventions.
The protection of pension assets, though benefitting employees,
presents a corresponding disadvantage to fiscally troubled states. An
advantage for states with defined benefit plans is that such plans need
not be fully funded: a state need only meet current retirees' benefit
payments. Depending on work force demographics, states can there-
incentives and interests. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 21, at 1112-13; Langbein,
supra note 60, at 131-33.
160. As noted at note 149 supra, ERISA prevents a private pension fund from
explicitly requiring a manager to vote in a particular way once it delegates voting power.
It is possible that courts would hold that state fiduciary law imposes a similar restriction
on public fund managers. But with good legal counsel and the use of industry-based
standards of prudent conduct, given the porousness of benchmark comparisons for
social investments, see supra note 42 and accompanying text, it will not be difficult for
fund sponsors to exert influence on managers' voting.
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fore use such a system to shift current expenses to future taxpayers.
The ability to engage in such an intergenerational wealth transfer will
be reduced to the extent that pension underfunding is impounded in
property values-future taxpayers will pay less for real property in the
state to compensate for their future pension liabilities. Whether pen-
sion liabilities are fully capitalized is, however, problematic: in addition
to the question whether property purchasers have access to complete
information about a state's pension liabilities, property tax receipts are
not a significant proportion of state revenues.1 61 This makes it prob-
able that states can redistribute wealth across generations of taxpayers
by following an underfunding policy.
Underfunding is not an option with a defined contribution plan:
payment of current expenses cannot be deferred because contributions
are paid to current employees. A shift to defined contribution plans
may thus prove politically difficult to implement in states whose defined
benefit plans are underfunded, and in financially troubled states that
are seeking to reduce current funding levels without having to renego-
tiate labor contracts. 162 State officials whose retirement systems are
underfunded therefore have incentives to oppose a pension reform that
replaces defined benefit plans with defined contribution plans. Em-
ployees and their unions, who would benefit from the greater protec-
tion afforded pension assets, might be able to rally enough political
support to negate state officials' opposition. However, they might hesi-
tate to do so because the public will more easily observe how much it is
paying state employees under a defined contribution plan than under a
defined benefit plan, whose costs are difficult to value and, depending
on work force demographics, extremely opaque. The public, for this
161. Proper impounding of future pension liabilities into property values is more
likely in the municipality than in the state context because, in contrast to state
expenditures, municipal liabilities are funded principally by property taxes. A study of
unfunded municipal pension liabilities found evidence that the liabilities were
capitalized in local property values, but concluded that more empirical work was
necessary before a definitive conclusion concerning whether such liabilities are fully
capitalized could be reached. See Dennis Epple & Katherine Schipper, Municipal
Pension Funding: A Theory and Some Evidence, in Carnegie Papers on Political
Economy 141, 169-70 (A. Meltzer et al. eds., 1981). The mitigation of intergenerational
wealth transfers by impounding in property prices does not arise in the social investing
context discussed supra notes 22-69 and accompanying text because lower returns from
poor social investments or voting strategies may not be predictable at the time of the
particular investment or voting decision. Moreover, such decisions are not disclosed to
taxpayers. As a result, subsequent financial losses will not be anticipated by property
purchasers.
162. The switch would not eliminate the states' existing liability. If a defined
benefit plan is underfunded, a shift to a defined contribution plan would require the
state to continue making payments into the terminated defined benefit plan until it is
fully funded. The present value of future benefits for the plan's full funding is
calculated by using the employees' salaries as of the plan's termination date, which is the
fund's legal liability, rather than at what their salaries would have been at retirement.
See Richard A. Ippolito, Pensions, Economics and Public Policy 36-42, 63-65 (1986).
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very reason, would also benefit from the proposed reorganization in
public pensions.
Despite the increased transparency of pension costs to taxpayers,
employees would benefit from defined contribution plans in several
ways beyond the fiscal protection already noted. In addition to offering
greater individual choice and control over retirement assets, defined
contribution plan pensions are fully portable across the public and pri-
vate sectors. If an individual covered by a defined benefit plan pension
switches employers, his or her pension is substantially diminished be-
cause benefits are pegged to years of service and final salary, with no
credit granted for service with another employer. Benefits under de-
fined contribution plans consist of the annual contributions to the em-
ployee's account and the account's accrued earnings. Thus, under such
plans an individual can search for the best employment opportunity
without being penalized.
Defined contribution plans also have several potential disadvan-
tages, though none is decisive. Employees bear the risk under such
plans that their investments will not provide sufficient income upon re-
tirement. By contrast, in a defined benefit plan, employers bear this
risk because the schedule of promised benefits is unrelated to fund as-
sets. Employees can, however, duplicate a defined benefit plan's sched-
ule of guaranteed annual payments by purchasing investments like
GICs for their defined contribution accounts. In addition, although
pension portability is an important benefit from the employee's per-
spective, it can be a disadvantage from the employer's perspective, be-
cause it eliminates a useful method of reducing work force turnover.
However, it has been contended that certain defined contribution plans
offset this disadvantage: to the extent that there is a correlation be-
tween the workers who are most valued by an employer and workers
who are savers, then a defined contribution plan is equally or more use-
ful to the employer in reducing turnover than is a defined benefit plan.
By matching contributions, the employer can pay selectively higher
wages to workers who reveal themselves as savers and such matching
will be disproportionately valued by workers intending to stay with the
firm over the long run.163
A related concern of employers is the fashioning of incentives to
induce employees to retire, given Congress' prohibition of involuntary
retirement. 164 The structure of a defined benefit plan provides greater
incentives for employees to retire than does that of a defined contribu-
tion plan. The funds that employers contribute into a defined contribu-
tion account belong to the employee immediately and they are an asset
163. See Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., Pension Plan Choice 14 (Dec. 1990).
164. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, § 4(f)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2)
(1988). Corporate executives and individuals in "high policymaking" positions are
excluded from the involuntary retirement ban if they are entitled to receive certain
retirement benefits. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(c).
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of the employee's estate if the employee dies before retirement. A de-
fined benefit plan pension, however, is not an asset that passes into an
employee's estate. An employee must retire to receive the pension, and
the total payout decreases the later one retires because benefit pay-
ments are not actuarily adjusted and terminate upon death, although
there are joint survivorship rights in vested pensions for spouses. 16 5 A
simple example illustrates the difference. Assume an unmarried, sixty-
five-year-old employee, with a life expectancy of twenty years (age
eighty-five), can retire at full benefits. If she retires now, she receives
twenty years of pension benefits. If she continues to work until age
seventy, she will receive only fifteen years of benefits. Although the
annual benefit level will be somewhat higher insofar as her final salary
will have increased over the five additional working years, the present
value of the pension will, in general, be lower if she continues to work
than if she retires at age sixty-five. This creates an incentive to retire.
The value of the pension in a defined contribution plan, however, will
not decrease over time (the account earns interest and continually
grows). Accordingly, compared to defined benefit plans, defined con-
tribution plans offer less of an inducement to retire. The tax code does
require distribution of assets in defined contribution plans to com-
mence when an individual reaches age seventy-and-a-half. 166 This re-
quirement might lessen the differential impact of the two kinds of
pension plans on retirement incentives for employees over age seventy,
but that impact will not be eliminated because the amount the em-
ployee receives under the defined contribution plan does not vary ac-
cording to whether or not he or she has retired.
The differential effect on retirement choices of defined benefit
plans compared to defined contribution plans does not, in any event,
appear to be significant in practice. The average retirement age has
fallen sharply over the past twenty-five years despite the prohibition on
mandatory retirement, and a number of studies indicate that the pri-
mary influence on retirement is the availability of Social Security bene-
fits at age sixty-two, not the payout structure of private pension
plans. 167 In addition, studies comparing retirement ages under defined
contribution and defined benefit plans provide only mixed evidence of
165. See Langbein & Wolk, supra note 148, at 433-34 (discussing augmentation of
nonemployee spouses' rights under the Retirement Equity Act of 1984). Some defined
benefit plans, such as New York state's plan, provide options that pay benefits to a
designated beneficiary upon the retiree's death.
166. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(9) (1988 & Supp. II 1990), 403(b)(10) (1988), 408(a)(6)
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990), 457(d)(2)(A) (1988) (covering qualified plans, and all tax-
favored retirement arrangements including IRAs, tax-sheltered annuities known as
403(b)(3) plans, and eligible deferred compensation plans of governments and tax-
exempt employers known as 457 plans). For a discussion of the federal tax code's
minimum distribution rules, see Langbein & Wolk, supra note 148, at 292-98.
167. See Michael D. Hurd, Research on the Elderly: Economic Status, Retirement,
and Consumption and Saving, 28 J. Econ. Literature 565 (1990).
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a difference in retirement age attributable to plan type.'68 Of course,
what is a disadvantage to employers regarding retirement choices
under a pension plan may well be an advantage from the vantage point
of older workers. One's assessment of this feature of defined contribu-
tion plans depends on one's evaluation of the effects of the congres-
sional decision to prohibit mandatory retirement on productivity,
employment levels, and individual workers' welfare.
This brief overview of the general issues concerning the choice of
pension plan form suggests that, although defined contribution plans
are not a panacea, their benefits decisively outweigh their disadvan-
tages. They may, for example, adversely affect workers' incentives to
retire or remain in their jobs. They also place the risk of accumulating
adequate retirement savings solely on the employee. But they have
compelling advantages over defined benefit plans. Defined contribu-
tion plans eliminate state officials' opportunities to conscript pension
assets into economic development and other types of social investing as
well as restrict their ability to influence share voting and other corpo-
rate governance activities. In addition, such pensions are portable and
secure-they cannot be underfunded or transferred to general revenue
accounts.
CONCLUSION
Recent proposals to enhance the role of public pension funds in
corporate governance implicitly assume that such funds are free of the
conflicts of interest that plague private fund managers. This Article's
data suggest that enthusiasm for such proposals ought to be more
168. These studies involve retirement patterns of university faculty. See G.
Gregory Lozier & MichaelJ. Dooris, Projecting Faculty Retirement: Factors Influencing
Individual Decisions, 81 Am. Econ. Rev., May 1991, at 101, 103. For a critique of the
elimination of mandatory retirement for universities, which notes that defined
contribution plans compound the problem, see Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds:
The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws 459-73 (1992). It should be noted
that the finding that most individuals continue to retire at normal retirement ages,
despite the absence of mandatory retirement policies, appears not to be duplicated in
the research university setting. In many states, state university pension plans are
separate from the plans of other public employees, including those of public school
teachers. Consequently, if the desire to encourage faculty retirement is thought to
outweigh the concerns expressed in this Article over the politicization of the
management of pension fund assets, the pension plans of state university professors
could, without difficulty, be maintained as defined benefit plans. Alternatively, these
institutions need not be exempt from the switch to defined contribution plans. Rather,
other incentive schemes to induce retirement could be devised, such as implementing
plans similar to those adopted by private universities, which are now fashioning
retirement incentive plans as they approach the end of their exemption from the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act's prohibition of a mandatory retirement policy. See
29 U.S.C. § 631(d) (1988) (to be repealed Dec. 31, 1993, see Age Discrimination in
Employment Amendments of 1986, § 6(b), Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3344 (1986)
(termination provision)).
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muted: political pressure to support local firms and engage in other
forms of social investing places important limits on the effectiveness of
public fund activism in corporate governance. Such pressure creates
conflicts of interest for public fund managers analogous to the business
conflicts of private fund managers, although these conflicts are likely to
be more geographically constrained than those of their private
counterparts.
The data bolster the Article's thesis that public funds face political
pressure on their decision-making. Funds with more politicized board
structures perform significantly more poorly than those with more in-
dependent boards. Policies favoring social investments also appear to
affect performance negatively, although the relationship is statistically
significant only at ten percent. Restrictions on South African invest-
ments adversely affect fund performance, most probably because of
their impact on asset allocation-portfolios weighted toward small firm
stocks performed poorly over the sample period. A fund's activism in
corporate governance does not appear to affect its performance.
There is little evidence that public and private fund managers dif-
ferentially support corporate management in proxy voting. In the vast
majority of cases, especially matters touching upon corporate control,
both groups of investors appear to follow the same voting strategy. Of
course, these data do not address recent gubernatorial efforts to inter-
fere in the internal organization of the New York and California state
pension funds. These events indicate that, as public funds become in-
creasingly active in corporate governance, they will experience in-
creased political pressure on both voting and investment decisions.
This pressure will produce .non-value-maximizing decisions at odds
with the interest of other investors. This tendency suggests that share-
holder activism by public pension funds will not be able to replace an
active market in corporate control as the most potent disciplining force
for aligning managers' incentives with shareholders' interests.
There are several organizational changes that could mitigate the
impact of political pressure on public funds' decision-making: (1) Fund
boards could be made more independent by increasing the number of
fund trustees elected by plan participants; (2) The fiduciary standards
of the federal ERISA statute could be extended to state plans; (3) State
constitutions could identify fund boards as the sole fiduciary of pension
funds so as to create a firewall against legislative interference in their
organization and administration; and (4) Greater reliance could be
placed on passive indexed investment strategies to reduce the opportu-
nities for exertion of political pressure on fund managers. None of
these proposals, however, completely eliminates the possibility of polit-
ical pressure on fund voting.
A more effective, albeit more drastic, structural reform would be
for states to switch from defined benefit plans to defined contribution
plans. This change would transfer pension assets from fund board to
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individual employee control. By eliminating the state's direct owner-
ship of fund assets, the opportunity to apply damaging political pres-
sure on decisions concerning those assets is diminished, if not
eliminated. However, by successfully depoliticizing board decisions,
the proposal also eliminates the role of public pension funds in corpo-
rate governance. Whether their replacements, financial intermediaries
such as mutual funds and insurance companies, would assume a more
active role in corporate governance in the absence of public fund ef-
forts is an open question.
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